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1 
THE COPYRIGHT/COMMERCE CLAUSE COLLISION: A 
SUBJECT MATTER APPROACH 
Kevin J. Hickey∗ 
This Article provides a novel theory of how the Constitution’s Copyright 
Clause limits congressional legislation enacted pursuant to other 
enumerated powers.  The Copyright Clause is both a grant of power and 
a limitation on the reach of that power: it provides that Congress may 
create “exclusive Right[s]” in the “Writings” of “Authors,” but that 
those rights must “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” 
and last only for “limited Times.”  Congress possesses other 
enumerated powers, however, including expansive Commerce Clause 
authority.  As intellectual property substantially affects interstate 
commerce, may Congress avoid the limitations of the Copyright Clause 
by legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause? 
 
Analyzing the structure of the Copyright Clause and the key precedents 
on inter-Clause conflicts, the Article proposes a subject matter 
approach to resolve this question.  The subject matter approach 
determines whether the law at issue is truly a “copyright law” that must 
comply with the Copyright Clause by examining the nature of the 
material regulated, the actions proscribed, and the scope of the rights 
granted by the law.  The touchstone is whether the challenged law 
grants authors generalized property rights in expression.  By contrast, if 
a law does not bear these hallmarks of traditional copyright protection, 
it may be permissible economic regulation within the Commerce Clause 
power, even if it relates to intellectual property. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Golan v. Holder held that 
Congress’s restoration of copyright protection to certain works in the 
public domain did not violate the limitations of the Constitution’s 
Copyright Clause.1  In reaching this result, the Court left unanswered a 
 
 1. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878 (2012). 
2
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss1/1
2013] THE COPYRIGHT/COMMERCE CLAUSE COLLISION 3 
critical antecedent question: why does Congress need to comply with the 
Copyright Clause at all?  Congressional power under the Copyright 
Clause carries with it express textual limitations, such as the 
requirement that copyright protection be afforded only for a “limited 
Time[].”2  But other applicable congressional powers, such as the 
Commerce Clause, are not so constrained.  The legislation at issue in 
Golan affected millions of artistic works,3 many of which have 
significant commercial value.4  This is undoubtedly a matter that 
“substantially affects” interstate commerce, and therefore within 
Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.5  Thus, even if the 
Court in Golan had ruled that the Copyright Clause power may not be 
used to remove a work from the public domain, why could Congress not 
simply rely on the Commerce Clause as an alternative source of 
authority? 
The question of whether Congress can constitutionally avoid the 
limitations of one enumerated power by legislating under another 
enumerated power has arisen in fields as diverse as bankruptcy,6 civil 
rights,7 and congressional spending.8  Though the problem is at least a 
century old in the intellectual property context,9 the Supreme Court has 
never addressed it directly.  Nor has any generally-accepted theory 
emerged from case law as to how to approach these issues.  Indeed, in 
the copyright context, constitutional challenges to the Digital 
 
 2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries”); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199 (2003) (interpreting the 
Copyright Clause’s “limited Times” requirement to mean that copyright terms must be “confined within 
certain bounds”). 
 3. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 900 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 4. For example, the popular works of the great Russian composers Dmitri Shostakovich and 
Igor Stravinsky are among the works whose copyright was restored by the legislation at issue in Golan. 
See Tyler T. Ochoa, Is the Copyright Public Domain Irrevocable? An Introduction to Golan v. Holder, 
64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 123, 139 (2011); Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 904 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting 
seven-fold increase in price of Shostakovich scores following copyright restoration). 
 5. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have the power . . . To regulate 
commerce . . . among the several states . . . .”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995) 
(providing that the Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate activates bearing a “substantial 
relation” to interstate commerce). 
 6. See Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468–69 (1982) (holding 
Congress may not avoid limits on Bankruptcy Clause power through Commerce Clause authority). 
 7. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252–57 (1964) (holding Title II of 
Civil Rights Act constitutional on Commerce Clause grounds despite limitation on Fourteenth 
Amendment powers).  
 8. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (holding that Congress may employ 
spending power to achieve objectives outside of the scope of enumerated powers by attaching conditions 
to the receipt of federal funds). 
 9. See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94–98 (1879) (holding federal trademark legislation 
unconstitutional under both Copyright and Commerce Clauses). 
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Millennium Copyright Act10 (the DMCA) and the so-called “anti-
bootlegging statutes”11 revealed a confused and conflicting array of 
results, approaches, and judicial tests.12 
The academic commentary, while impressive in quantity,13 is 
frequently not much more satisfying.  Too often, analysis of the issue 
focuses solely on whether the Copyright Clause’s limitations should (or 
should not) apply to one particular piece of legislation,14 without 
articulating a broader approach to the conflict at the intersection of the 
Copyright and Commerce Clauses.15  Such inter-Clause conflict is not 
 
 10. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1205 (2012). 
 11. 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2012). 
 12. With regard to the criminal enforcement provision of the anti-bootlegging laws, compare 
United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1276–80 (11th Cir. 1999) (upholding the law as a valid 
exercise of Commerce Clause authority because it was not “fundamentally inconsistent” with the 
Copyright Clause), with United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 419–28 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
[hereinafter Martignon SDNY] (striking down the law because it was “copyright-like” yet did not 
comply with the limitations of the Copyright Clause).  The latter case was reversed by United States v. 
Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 153 (2d Cir. 2007) [hereinafter Martignon].  With regard to the civil 
enforcement provisions, compare KISS Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 837 (C.D. 
Cal. 2004) [hereinafter KISS I] (striking down the statute as outside of Copyright Clause powers because 
the specific provisions of the Copyright Clause trump the general Commerce Clause power), with KISS 
Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods., 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1171–76 (C.D. Cal. 2005) [hereinafter KISS II] 
(reversing KISS I, reasoning that the Commerce Clause and Copyright Clauses are independent grants of 
authority).  
 13. For example, the district court decision in the Martignon case, which found the anti-
bootlegging statutes unconstitutional, has by itself inspired a small subfield of commentary.  See 
generally, e.g., Craig W. Mandell, Balance of Powers: Recognizing the Uruguay Round Agreement 
Act’s Anti-Bootlegging Provisions as a Constitutional Exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause 
Authority, 54 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 673 (2007); Hugh C. Hansen et al., U.S. v. Martignon—Case 
in Controversy, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1223 (2006); David Patton, The 
Correct-Like Decision in United States v. Martignon, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
1287 (2006); Yavar Bathaee, Note, A Constitutional Idea-Expression Doctrine: Qualifying Congress’ 
Commerce Power When Protecting Intellectual Property Rights, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 441 (2008); Brian Danitz, Comment, Martignon and Kiss Catalog: Can Live Performances Be 
Protected?, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143 (2005); Adam Giuliano, Note, Steal 
This Concert? The Federal Anti-Bootlegging Statute Gets Struck Down, But Not Out, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L. 
& PRAC. 373 (2005); Andrew B. Peterson, Note, To Bootleg or Not to Bootleg? Confusion Surrounding 
the Constitutionality of the Anti-Bootlegging Act Continues, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 723 (2005); Michael C. 
Shue, Case Note, United States v. Martignon: The First Case to Rule that the Federal Anti-Bootlegging 
Statute is Unconstitutional Copyright Legislation, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 131 (2005). 
 14. See, e.g., Giuliano, supra note 13, at 375–76 (concluding, without extending analysis or 
considering other fields, that Commerce Clause power can be used to uphold anti-bootlegging statutes 
as they complement copyright protection); Peterson, supra note 13, at 737–44 (concluding Congress 
cannot resort to Commerce Clause power to uphold anti-bootlegging statutes without examining 
consequences in other areas); Michael B. Gerdes, Comment, Getting Beyond Constitutionally Mandated 
Originality as a Prerequisite for Federal Copyright Protection, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1461, 1468–70 (1992) 
(concluding Congress may use Commerce Power to uphold sui generis protection of databases without 
articulating any general theory). 
 15. There are several important and thoughtful exceptions to this generalization.  See, e.g., 
Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s External Limitations, 61 DUKE L.J. 1329 (2012); 
Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 272 (2004); 
Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property 
4
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unique to the anti-bootlegging statutes or the DMCA, after all—parallel 
questions arise in assessing the constitutionality of federal trademark, 
trade secret, and database protection.  A complete theory, therefore, 
must answer the question of when each of the Copyright Clause’s 
limitations will be applied externally to other enumerated powers across 
all of these diverse areas.  The problem of the Copyright and Commerce 
Clause’s “collision”16 thus remains under-theorized.17 
This Article analyzes the structure of the Copyright Clause and the 
key judicial precedents on inter-Clause conflicts to conclude that the 
limitations of the Copyright Clause must, in some cases, constrain the 
exercise of Commerce Clause power.18  Having reached that conclusion, 
the more difficult question becomes defining when the limitations of the 
Copyright Clause will apply externally to the exercise of other 
congressional powers.  Relying on a novel analysis of the theories in the 
existing literature, this Article maintains that a subject-matter-based 
approach is the most defensible as a matter of copyright and 
constitutional law and policy.19 
The subject matter approach advanced here is a multifactor test that 
looks to the nature of the material regulated, the actions proscribed, and 
the particular rights granted to determine whether the law at issue is 
truly a “copyright law” that must comply with the limitations of the 
Copyright Clause.  The touchstone is whether the challenged law grants 
authors generalized property rights in expression—in particular, the 
right to proscribe unauthorized reproduction of their works.  If a law 
does not bear these hallmarks of traditional copyright protection, it is 
permissible economic regulation within the Commerce Clause power, 
even though it may impact intellectual property.  The subject matter 
 
Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119 (2000).  The theoretical 
contributions of these and other commentators are discussed in detail in Part IV, infra. 
 16. This term is taken from the title of an article by Professor William Patry.  See William Patry, 
The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property: An Imminent Constitutional Collision, 67 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359 (1999).  I will also use the expression “Copyright/Commerce Clause conflict” 
to refer to the issue. 
 17. See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 15, at 1335 (“Some [commentators] propose that the 
[Copyright] Clause restrains Congress’s other powers.  These works, however, tend to be 
undertheorized.”).  This may be in part due to the sparse—and seemingly contradictory—Supreme 
Court precedent.  See KISS I, 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 834 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (noting that only a “small 
number of cases . . . touch on the constitutional question”); United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 
1279 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting “tension” in the relevant Supreme Court precedents); Dotan Oliar, 
Resolving Conflicts Among Congress’s Powers Regarding Statutes’ Constitutionality: The Case of Anti-
Bootlegging Statutes, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467, 488 (2007) (“Unfortunately, the highly relevant 
cases [on the enumerated powers collision problem] differ in their holding—two of them do not allow 
Congress to circumvent limitations in one enumerated power by acting through another while three 
others do—and in their reasoning.”). 
 18. See infra Part III. 
 19. See infra Parts IV & V. 
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approach thus preserves a robust role for the Copyright Clause’s 
limitations but confines them to their traditional purview.  Moreover, the 
subject matter inquiry does not depend on malleable notions of 
“structural purpose,” “fundamental inconsistencies,” “constitutional 
norms,” and the like—notions that have dominated the academic 
literature on the issue.20  The subject matter approach instead provides a 
simple, workable, and coherent doctrinal framework to resolve the 
Copyright/Commerce Clause conflict. 
This Article’s approach is distinct from those proposed by other 
commentators.  Some scholars have concluded that the Copyright 
Clause limitations simply do not apply externally—that is, Commerce 
Clause power operates independently from any Copyright Clause 
constraints.21  Others, while agreeing that the Copyright Clause 
limitations sometimes apply to some purported Commerce Clause 
legislation, define both those limits and the scope of their applicability 
quite differently.  Professor Jeanne Fromer, for example, would apply 
the Copyright Clause’s limitations to any legislation with the “structural 
purpose” of “promoting the progress of science and useful arts,” unless 
Congress proves by clear and convincing evidence that it intended to 
further legitimate non-“Progress”-promoting interests.22  By contrast, the 
subject matter approach is not dependent on difficult-to-ascertain 
notions of congressional purpose, and would apply the Copyright Clause 
limitations absolutely—albeit within a smaller sphere of legislative 
actions.  Professors Paul Heald and Suzanna Sherry take another, quite 
different approach, relying on the history of the Copyright Clause to 
deduce “implied limits”—such as a “public domain principle”—that 
apply whenever “legislation . . . imposes monopoly-like costs on the 
public through the granting of exclusive rights.”23  Their theory thus 
differs both in the limitations that apply to Congress and in which 
congressional actions will trigger those limits. 
This Article makes three core contributions to the existing literature.  
First, it collects and analyzes the various theories that have been 
proposed to reconcile conflicts between the Copyright and Commerce 
 
 20. See infra Part IV. 
 21. See, e.g., Nachbar, supra note 15, at 277 (“The Intellectual Property Clause and its limits do 
not represent generally applicable constitutional norms and Congress may therefore legislate pursuant to 
the Commerce Clause without regard to the Intellectual Property Clause.”).  Edward C. Waterscheid 
takes a related view, in that he does not consider the Copyright Clause’s power to “secur[e] for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries,” to 
limit a more general authority to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” by whatever means 
Congress chooses.  See Edward C. Waterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: 
The Anatomy of a Congressional Power, 43 IDEA 1, 20–23 (2002). 
 22. See Fromer, supra note 15, at 1372. 
 23. See Heald & Sherry, supra note 15, at 1119, 1160.  
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Clause powers, offering a novel and useful organization of the existing 
case law and commentary.  Second, it offers a defense of the subject 
matter approach as doctrinally and normatively superior to the 
alternative theories.  Third, it details a proposed framework to give 
precise, substantive content to the subject matter test—what is and is not 
a “copyright law” for the purposes of Copyright/Commerce Clause 
collision—to transform it into a clear and workable standard.  The 
resulting multifactor approach culls the strongest ideas from existing 
commentary and offers a compelling reconciliation of the existing case 
law. 
The Article begins by identifying four key areas in which the 
Commerce Clause power has been advanced to support legislation 
arguably outside of the Copyright Clause’s limits: trademarks, database 
protection, the DMCA, and the anti-bootlegging statutes.  It next 
reviews the relevant case law, beginning with the historical Supreme 
Court precedents on inter-Clause conflicts, and then discusses more 
recent copyright-related challenges to the DMCA and the anti-
bootlegging statutes.   
Having laid the necessary groundwork, the Article moves to theory.  
Part III sets out the boundaries of the debate.  On the one hand, treating 
the enumerated powers as completely independent grants of authority 
seems to write the Copyright Clause’s limitations out of the 
Constitution, allowing, for example, patents on obvious inventions or 
perpetual copyrights under the Commerce power.  Such a result cannot 
easily be reconciled with Supreme Court precedent.  On the other hand, 
holding the Copyright Clause’s limitations applicable to anything 
“intellectual property-like” would seem to sound the death knell for, 
inter alia, federal trademark law or trade secret protections, which stand 
on equally firm legal ground.  Existing doctrine thus implies that the 
limitations of the Copyright Clause must be to some degree externally 
applicable, but they cannot be so applied in every instance.  To be 
consistent with Supreme Court precedent, a theory of the 
Copyright/Commerce Clause collision must articulate principles which 
define a closed set of cases in which a given Copyright Clause limitation 
will be externally applied. 
Part IV critically analyzes the leading theories found in the case law 
and commentary, organizing them into five conceptual categories.  The 
first group, which this Article calls “structural” theories, relies primarily 
on inferences from the Constitution’s structure, arguing for broad 
external application based on analogies to various other constitutional 
provisions.  The second group of theories focuses on the text of the 
Copyright Clause, arguing that external application is only appropriate 
when the language at issue is an affirmative limitation, as opposed to a 
7
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mere lack of authority.  This Article labels this view the “textualist” 
approach, though it is distinct from any particular view of statutory 
interpretation.  “Purpose-based” theories, the third group, look to the 
purposes behind the two enumerated powers at issue as the critical 
factor.  The fourth and largest group, which this Article calls “values-
based” theories, argues that Copyright Clause limitations should be 
applied to the Commerce Clause only when some normative trigger is 
satisfied—e.g., when the law at issue is “fundamentally inconsistent” 
with the Copyright Clause, or when the limitation at issue rises to the 
level of a “constitutional norm.”  The final group is termed “subject 
matter” approaches.  They answer the question of whether the Copyright 
Clause ought to apply externally by reference to the substance of the 
challenged law, such as the material it regulates and the specific rights 
granted. 
Part V defends and expounds upon the subject matter approach.  It 
argues that the subject matter test offers a consistent, workable approach 
to the problem that resolves the conflicts in existing precedent.  Next, it 
defines explicit criteria as to what makes a particular piece of legislation 
a “copyright law,” looking to (1) the actions proscribed, (2) the material 
protected, and (3) the character of the rights afforded (including the 
means of enforcing those rights).  Finally, Part VI illustrates how the 
subject matter test works in practice by applying this proposed 
framework to several prominent examples of the Copyright/Commerce 
Clause collision. 
 II. THE COPYRIGHT/COMMERCE CLAUSE COLLISION 
The Copyright Clause24 of the Constitution reads: “The Congress 
shall have the Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”  It is well 
recognized that the clause is “both a grant of power and a limitation.”25  
In particular, the Clause has been interpreted to embody at least five 
limitations attendant to the use of Copyright Clause power.26  First, as 
rights secured are to the “Writings” of “Authors,” it is clear that only 
original works may be copyrighted.27  As a corollary, only expression, 
 
 24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Since the clause is read to grant Congress the power to establish 
both copyright and patent law, the clause is more accurately referred to as the “Copyright/Patent Clause” 
or the “Intellectual Property Clause.” Since this Article concerns itself principally with the power to 
grant copyrights, I will refer to it as simply the “Copyright Clause” as a convenient shorthand. 
 25. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966). 
 26. Caroline T. Nguyen, Note, Expansive Copyright Protection for All Time? Avoiding Article I 
Horizontal Limitations Through the Treaty Power, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1079, 1084 (2006). 
 27. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–46 (1991) (“The sine qua 
8
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss1/1
2013] THE COPYRIGHT/COMMERCE CLAUSE COLLISION 9 
and not facts or ideas themselves, can be the subject of a copyright.28  
Third, from the phrase “limited Times,” copyright protection must only 
persist for a finite period.29 Fourth—and controversially30—since only 
“Writings” can be protected, the object of a copyright must be fixed in a 
tangible medium, i.e., some physical rendering of the fruits of 
intellectual labor.31  Finally, the preamble of the Copyright Clause 
establishes that the legislation must “promote the Progress of Science,”32 
though this requirement has been interpreted broadly and deferentially.33 
If a piece of intellectual property-like legislation fails to satisfy one or 
more of these limitations, is it therefore unconstitutional, or may the 
Commerce Power—or another enumerated power34—be relied upon to 
save it?  The first section of this Part lays out four important areas in 
which this question arises: trademarks, database protection, the DMCA, 
and the anti-bootlegging statutes.  Though this list is by no means 
 
non of copyright is originality. . . .  Originality is a constitutional requirement.”). 
 28. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985) (“[Under the 
copyright statute,] no author may copyright facts or ideas.”).  The Feist Court arguably 
constitutionalized this so-called “idea–expression” dichotomy—embodied in 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)—by 
making clear that originality requires independent creation in addition to minimal creativity.  Feist, 499 
U.S. at 345.  According to Feist, facts are discovered, not created, and therefore are not original.  Id. at 
347–48.  Ideas would seem to be non-original by the same line of reasoning.  See Nguyen, supra note 
26, at 1086–87 (arguing that the idea–expression distinction was given a “constitutional basis” in Feist).  
Of course, ideas may be protected under the Copyright Clause’s patent power as “Discoveries.”  
 29. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199 (2003) (interpreting “limited Times” to mean that 
copyright terms must be “confine[d] within certain bounds”). 
 30. No Supreme Court case has explicitly held that fixation is a constitutional requirement, 
though that is the view of a majority of commentators and some lower courts have so held.  Nguyen, 
supra note 26, at 1087–89.  The crux of the argument hinges on the meaning given to the word 
“Writing” as used in the Copyright Clause.  The majority view argues that “Writings” implies fixation, 
see David Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1385, 1409 (1995) (“[N]o respectable 
interpretation of the word “Writings” embraces [unfixed expression].”), though critics argue that 
fixation is merely a creature of the copyright statute, opting for a broader view of “Writings,” see PAUL 
GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 17.6.1, at 17:56 (3d ed. 2005) (“There is little doubt that performances 
subject to protection are “writings” in the constitutional sense for, beyond literalism, there is nothing in 
the mechanical act of fixation to distinguish writings from nonwritings.”). 
 31. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973). 
 32. “Science,” in the context of the Copyright Clause, means “knowledge and learning”; the 
“useful Arts” refers to Congress’s power to grant patents.  See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 
(2012) (“Perhaps counterintuitively for the contemporary reader, Congress’ copyright authority is tied to 
the progress of science; its patent authority, to the progress of the useful arts.”) (citations omitted). 
 33. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 887–89 (copyright legislation is constitutional so long as Congress 
“rationally could have concluded” that it “may promote knowledge and learning”). 
 34. This Article is limited to the intersection of the Copyright Clause and the Commerce Clause, 
though the Commerce Clause is not the only alternate source of authority on which Congress might rely 
when enacting copyright-like legislation that fails to satisfy the Copyright Clause’s limitations.  For 
example, in the context of the anti-bootlegging statutes—which were enacted to satisfy the United 
States’ international treaty obligations—it is often argued that the Treaty Clause, instead of the 
Copyright Clause, may be relied upon to support the legislation.  See generally, e.g., Symposium, 
Copyright Lawmaking Authority: An (Inter)nationalist Perspective on the Treaty Clause, 30 COLUM. 
J.L. & ARTS 287 (2007); Nguyen, supra note 26. 
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exhaustive,35 these fields represent some of the principal controversies 
in the Copyright/Commerce Clause conflict, and will be used as 
examples throughout this Article to help analyze the theories proposed 
to resolve the conflict.  Having gained a better sense of the contours of 
the controversy, this Part’s second section discusses the Supreme Court 
and other precedents that speak most directly to the issue. 
A. Areas of Tension 
1. Trademarks 
Though their historical roots lie in the law of unfair competition,36 
today trademarks are usually classified as a species of intellectual 
property.37  Federal trademark laws prohibit, inter alia, any person (other 
than the registrant) from using a registered mark in commerce in ways 
likely to confuse consumers.38  Trademarks thus afford exclusive rights 
in (certain uses of) expression—the words, symbols, and pictorial 
elements that make up a particular mark. 
But these rights cannot be granted under the power contained within 
the Copyright Clause, for two reasons.  First, unlike copyrights and 
patents, trademarks are not granted for “limited Times.”  So long as the 
mark remains in use in commerce39 and does not become a generic 
term,40 trademark rights can exist in perpetuity,41 at least in theory.  
 
 35. Other areas of potential controversy include federal trade secret legislation, see The 
Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 1831–1839 (2012), and the restoration of the copyrights 
in certain foreign works that had fallen into the public domain, see 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2012). 
 36. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property As Property: Delineating Entitlements In 
Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1754 (2008) (noting trademark has its origins in, and is indeed an 
“outgrowth” of, the law of unfair competition); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and 
Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1072 (2005) (“[I]n another era we treated intellectual property as a 
species of business tort [instead of intellectual property].”). 
 37. It is common, for example, for introductory law school surveys on “intellectual property” to 
cover copyright, patent, and trademark as the three main “species” of intellectual property.  See 
generally, e.g., ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF 
COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS & TRADEMARKS (2003) (casebook covering copyright, patent, and trademark 
law as forms of intellectual property); CRAIG A. NARD ET AL., THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
(2006) (same).  See also e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining “intellectual 
property” as “compris[ing] primarily trademark, copyright, and patent rights”); Edward C. Walterscheid, 
Divergent Evolution of the Patent Power and the Copyright Power, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 
307, 308 n.8 (2005) (“In the modern era, trademarks are treated as a separate species of intellectual 
property, distinct from patents and copyrights . . . .”). 
 38. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2012).  
 39. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2012) (providing for cancellation of a mark that has been 
“abandoned”). 
 40. See id. (providing for cancellation of a mark that has become “the generic name for the 
goods or services”). 
 41. See Christopher Springman, Indirect Enforcement Of The Intellectual Property Clause, 30 
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Second, there is no requirement that the marks protected be original (a 
constitutional requirement for copyrights)42 or nonobvious (the 
analogous constitutional requirement for patents).43  In other words, 
trademarks are often not the work of “Authors” or “Inventors.”  For 
example, provided certain statutory requirements are met,44 there is 
nothing to prevent acquiring a trademark on, for example, the mark 
“Yummy Cookies,” though this phrase is obvious and does not satisfy 
even the minimal amount of creativity required for a copyright.45 
In the Trade-Mark Cases, the Supreme Court struck down one of 
Congress’s early attempts at federal trademark legislation,46 finding it 
outside of Copyright Clause authority for the reasons outlined in the 
preceding paragraph.  Federal trademark regulation was also found to be 
beyond the scope of Commerce Clause authority,47 though the Trade-
Mark Cases were decided before New Deal expansions of Commerce 
Clause power.  There is little doubt that the current trademark statute—
the Lanham Act of 194648—passes muster under modern Commerce 
Clause doctrine,49 in large part because it contains an express 
jurisdictional limitation, restricting its applicability to marks used in 
commerce that Congress has the power to regulate.50  After more than 
fifty years without constitutional challenge, it is clear that trademarks 
represent a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.51  
 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 565, 586 (2007) (“[T]he federal rights created under the Lanham Act are 
perpetual.”). 
 42. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 43. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966) (establishing that nonobviousness 
requirement of patent law is mandated by “constitutional command”). 
 44. In particular, since “Yummy Cookies” is a descriptive mark—it describes a characteristic of 
the goods sold, see 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (2012)—the registrant would need to establish “secondary 
meaning,” i.e., that the mark “has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce,” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1052(f) (2012), to register the mark.  
 45. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991) (“[T]he Constitution 
mandates some minimal degree of creativity [as a prerequisite to copyright.]”). 
 46. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94, 99 (1879). 
 47. Id. at 96–99. 
 48. Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–
1141). 
 49. The modern boundaries of Commerce Clause authority allow Congress to regulate: (1) the 
use of the channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persona 
and things in interstate commerce; and (3) activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.  
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995). 
 50. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (limiting the Lanham Act’s applicability to marks used in 
commerce “which may lawfully be regulated by Congress”).  It is unclear whether a trademark law like 
the 1876 Act, containing no jurisdictional limitation, would be found to comport with modern 
conceptions of Commerce Clause authority were it enacted today.  See infra note 96 (discussing the 
issue). 
 51. See, e.g., Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 365 (2d Cir. 1959) 
(“Clearly Congress has the power under the commerce clause to afford protection to marks used in 
interstate commerce.”). 
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Trademarks thus stand as a well-established example of a permissible 
use of the Commerce Clause power to enact intellectual property 
legislation that falls outside of the Copyright Clause’s grant of 
authority.52 
2. Database Protection 
In the landmark case of Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service 
Company,53 the Supreme Court considered the extent to which factual 
compilations, or databases, may be copyrighted.  The case was a dispute 
between two publishers of telephone directories; one company had 
copied the listings of the other and was sued for copyright 
infringement.54  The Supreme Court held that originality—defined as 
independent creation plus a minimal degree of creativity55—is a 
constitutional prerequisite for copyright protection.56  Since telephone 
directories consist of facts (which are discovered and not created), 
copyright protection can exist only if the selection or arrangement of the 
facts is (minimally) creative.57  As an alphabetic listing of names and 
phone numbers is not original, no copyright existed in the telephone 
directories in Feist.58 
In holding that copyrighted works must be original, the Supreme 
Court departed from a line of cases that had allowed copyright in non-
original databases on the basis of the work that went into compiling the 
information—the so-called “sweat of the brow” doctrine.59  Such cases 
argued that the labor expended in collecting facts was a form of 
authorship, and should be protected lest others copy and free-ride off 
these labors.60  After Feist, producers of databases argued that protection 
against copying is needed to stop piracy and maintain economic 
incentives to create and compile databases.61  The European Union, 
seeking to create such positive incentives for commercial database 
 
 52. See Patry, supra note 16, at 391 (“Trademark protection is the prime example of permissible 
Commerce Clause legislation in the area of intellectual property”). 
 53. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 54. Id. at 342–44. 
 55. Id. at 345. 
 56. Id. at 345–46. 
 57. Id. at 347–48.  
 58. Id. at 363. 
 59. Id. at 352–54. 
 60. See, e.g., Jeweler’s Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 281 F. 83, 88–89 (2d Cir. 1922) 
(famously articulating the “sweat of the brow” doctrine). 
 61. See Malla Pollack, The Right to Know?: Delimiting Database Protection at the Juncture of 
the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause, and the First Amendment, 17 CARDOZO ARTS 
& ENT. L.J. 47, 90 (1999) (“Sponsors characterize [U.S. database protection] as a necessary measure to 
protect American companies from bankruptcy due to post-Feist pirates . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
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creation, has passed a form of intellectual property protection for 
databases.62 
Responding to similar pressures, several proposals for sui generis 
(non-copyright) database protection have been advanced in the U.S. 
Congress.63  Given Feist, there is little doubt that such legislation cannot 
be supported by Congress’s power under the Copyright Clause.64  
Whether Congress may instead rely on Commerce Clause power to 
establish a system of database protection, however, remains an open and 
controversial question.  As none of the proposals advanced has been 
enacted, there is as of yet no case law on the issue, but the academic 
debate on the issue has been intense, with strong voices on both sides.65 
3. The DMCA’s Anti-Circumvention Provisions 
The anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act prohibit the circumvention of certain technological 
measures protecting copyrighted works.66  The DMCA distinguishes 
between technological means that restrict particular uses of copyrighted 
works—e.g., Apple’s former restriction that songs purchased through 
iTunes may be used only on a limited number of devices67—and those 
that prevent access to a copyrighted work—e.g., a website using 
passwords and encryption to allow only paying users to view 
copyrighted material.  With regard to access restrictions, Congress 
proscribed both the act of circumventing the protections as well as 
trafficking in a device designed to circumvent such technological 
 
 62. Directive 96/9/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the 
Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20. See generally Mark Powell, The European Union’s 
Database Directive: An International Antidote to the Side Effects of Feist?, 20 FORDHAM INTL. L.J. 
1215, 1215–23 (1997) (describing and giving background on the EU system of database protection). 
 63. E.g., H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999); H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999); H.R. 
2652, 105th Cong. (1st Sess. 1998).  
 64. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSOCIATE WHITE HOUSE 
COUNSEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS RAISED BY THE COLLECTIONS OF INFORMATION ANTIPIRACY 
ACT, available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/righto.htm (concluding that legislation protecting 
databases could not be supported under the Intellectual Property Clause) [hereinafter Dep’t of Justice, 
CIAA Memo]. 
 65. Compare, e.g., Justin Hughes, How Extra-Copyright Protection of Databases Can Be 
Constitutional, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 159, 160–61 (2002) (contending that “substantial arguments” 
support the constitutionality of database protection), with Pollack, supra note 61, at 49 (contending that 
a proposal for database protection is “both unconstitutional and ill-considered”), and Yochai Benkler, 
Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection: The Role of Judicial Review in the Creation and 
Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535, 537–39 (2000) (arguing that 
some of the proposed database protections pass constitutional muster but others do not). 
 66. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)–(b) (2012). 
 67. See Monika Roth, Note, Entering the DRM-Free Zone: An Intellectual Property and 
Antitrust Analysis of the Online Music Industry, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 515, 
524 (2008) (explaining Apple’s policy). 
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restrictions.68  With regard to use restrictions, only trafficking in devices 
designed to circumvent such restrictions was prohibited.69  The act of 
circumventing use restrictions was not proscribed so as to preserve fair 
use rights.70 
Most of the constitutional challenges made against the DMCA allege 
it violates the First Amendment by restricting speech or being 
unconstitutionally overbroad.71  Though these are serious and important 
arguments, since this Article is concerned with the limitations of the 
Copyright Clause—and not the First Amendment—it will assume that 
the DMCA survives First Amendment scrutiny, as several courts have 
so held.72 
But even if the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions do not violate 
the First Amendment, they may still be unconstitutional as outside of the 
scope of Congress’s enumerated powers.  The primary claim is that the 
DMCA violates the “limited Times” provision of the Copyright Clause 
by granting copyright owners de facto perpetual rights through 
technological protection measures.73  Though the DMCA applies only to 
works still covered by copyright, there remains a practical concern that 
allowing technological protection measures to be embedded into works 
will prevent free copying and dissemination once the copyright (but not 
the technological protection measure) expires.74  The reasoning goes as 
follows: assume that a copyright owner sells only copy-protected 
versions of his work while it remains under copyright.  Once the 
copyright expires, the owners of individual copies are theoretically free 
to copy and disseminate what is now a public domain work.  Practically, 
 
 68. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1), (2) (2012). 
 69. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (2012). 
 70. See H.R. Rep. 105-551, pt. 1, at 18 (1998) (“[W]here the access is authorized . . . an 
individual . . . would be able [to circumvent technological protections] in order to make fair use of a 
work he or she has acquired lawfully.”). 
 71. See, e.g., Universal Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 325–41 (S.D.N.Y 2000) 
(rejecting various First Amendment challenges to the DMCA). 
 72. See id.; United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1125–37 (N.D. Cal. 2002) 
(rejecting First Amendment challenges to DMCA).  I will also ignore the claim that the DMCA 
unconstitutionally limits fair use rights, as fair use rights, if constitutionally required at all, likely find 
their source in the First Amendment and not the Copyright Clause, though the law is not clear on this 
point.  See Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1133–34 n.4. 
 73. See Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1141. 
 74. The scenario laid out here is but one line of reasoning under which the DMCA may allow the 
creation of a de facto perpetual copyright.  Another common concern is the fear that public domain (or 
other non-copyrighted) works will tied to a copyrighted “fig leaf”—some insignificant matter placed 
together with and under the same technological protection as the public domain work.  Because the fig 
leaf is copyrighted, circumvention will violate the access restrictions of the DMCA, even if the only 
work truly sought is in the public domain.  See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichman et al., A Reverse Notice and 
Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, 22 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 981, 1022 n.219 (explaining how such “fig leafs” are used to protect 
uncopyrightable information). 
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however, they cannot—though there is no legal reason they cannot 
circumvent the technological protection measures themselves, many 
users will lack the technical expertise to do so.  Further, in all likelihood, 
they will not be able to rely on the technical expertise of others to 
circumvent the copy protection.  Any device designed to circumvent the 
protection will likely also circumvent the protection of other, non-public 
domain works, and will therefore be in violation of the DMCA if it is 
distributed to others.75  Though no court has found the DMCA 
unconstitutional on such grounds, the anti-circumvention provisions 
represent another regulatory area in which Congress might wish to rely 
on Commerce Clause authority to avoid the limitations of the Copyright 
Clause. 
4. The Anti-Bootlegging Statutes 
The anti-bootlegging statutes were passed in 1994 as part of the 
Uruguay Round Agreement Act, pursuant to agreements the United 
States had made in certain international intellectual property treaties.76  
The statutes consist of a civil and criminal provision.  The civil 
provision (Section 1101) makes liable, “to the same extent as an 
infringer of copyright,” a person who “without the consent of the 
performer . . . fixes the sounds or images of a live musical performance 
in a copy or phonorecord,” or transmits, sells, or distributes any copy or 
phonorecord of said bootlegged performance.77  The criminal provision 
(Section 2319A) prohibits the same activities, but associates a different 
penalty: up to 5–10 years imprisonment.78  As a criminal statute, it 
additionally requires that the bootlegger “knowingly” made the 
recordings for financial gain.79 
The anti-bootlegging statutes are arguably outside of the scope of the 
Copyright Clause power for at least two reasons.80  The first derives 
 
 75. If access to a significant number of public domain works is blocked by technological 
protections, it is possible that a sufficiently narrowly-tailored technology could be designed and 
trafficked in without running afoul of the DMCA.  Since any device marketed with knowledge of its 
illegal circumventing use, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(C) (2012), or primarily designed for circumvention, 
id. § 1201(a)(2)(A), is prohibited, any legal device must be conceived and designed with only its 
permissible use—circumventing protection of public domain works—in mind.  Finally, there will need 
to be enough public domain works under technological measures such that obtaining access to public 
domain works constitutes a “commercially significant purpose” that is more than “limited.” Id. 
§ 1201(a)(2)(B). 
 76. Nguyen, supra note 26, at 1091–92. 
 77. 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012). 
 78. 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2012). 
 79. KISS I, 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 830 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 
 80. Some commentators have argued that, in addition to the “limited Times” and fixation 
arguments, the anti-bootlegging statutes may violate other limitations of the Copyright Clause.  See 
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from the language of the Copyright Clause, which only allows Congress 
to protect “Writings.”81  Though the Supreme Court has never made the 
limitation explicit, most commentators (and some lower courts) believe 
that inherent in the word “Writings” is a constitutional requirement of 
fixation, i.e., that the creative work of the author must be embodied in 
some physical, tangible form before it may be the subject of copyright.82  
Assuming fixation is indeed constitutionally mandated, the first 
argument for the unconstitutionality of the anti-bootlegging statutes runs 
roughly thus: Since live musical performances are not fixed, they cannot 
be protected under the Copyright Clause; therefore, the anti-bootlegging 
statutes are unconstitutional if Congress cannot rely instead on its 
Commerce Clause (or some other) power. 
Though the requirement of fixation may seem rather technical or 
formalistic to a reader unfamiliar with copyright, it has been a part of 
federal copyright law since its inception83 and advances important 
copyright policies.  First, fixation serves significant manageability and 
evidentiary concerns.  If every fleeting expression—e.g., all the 
utterances of everyday conversation—could be copyrighted, courts 
might potentially be inundated with claims of copyright and difficult 
factual disputes over who said what first.84  More fundamentally, the 
fixation requirement can be seen as part of copyright’s quid pro quo 
between the public and authors of creative works.  The fundamental 
rationale of granting a copyright is to facilitate the creation of works 
which will benefit the public.  After a limited period, the work falls into 
the public domain and may be freely enjoyed and copied by all.85  
 
Oliar, supra note 17, at 492–95 (arguing that the anti-bootlegging statutes may also conflict with the 
Copyright Clause’s preamble and its requirements of authorship and originality). These arguments have 
not achieved widespread recognition and have not been advanced in the cases challenging the anti-
bootlegging statutes, so I do not elaborate upon them here. 
 81. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 82. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
 83. Stefan Hubanov, The Multifaceted Nature and Problematic Status of Fixation in U.S. 
Copyright Law, 11 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 111, 111 (2006) (“There is . . . a general understanding that 
fixation has been an implicit part of federal copyright law since its very inception.”). 
 84. See id. at 119–20.  Of course, since copyright law no longer requires any formalities to 
secure a copyright, there is already a tremendous amount of material—e.g., all of the emails sent each 
day—that is automatically copyrighted, so it is arguable how realistic this “inundation” fear is.  Id. 
 85. The reader may note some tension between this understanding of the fixation requirement (as 
a way to ensure copies exist for a robust public domain), and the history of copyright protection under 
state common law.  Before the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976, federal copyright protection was 
triggered only when a work was first “published.” Prior to publication, the author possessed exclusive 
rights in his work under common law copyright, which could persist from the time of creation until 
publication—that is, potentially, in perpetuity.  See generally Robert A. Gorman, An Overview of the 
Copyright Act of 1976, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 856, 857–60 (1978). State copyright law thus created some 
incentive to keep a work private and unpublished (so long as one did not wish to commercially exploit 
it), yet the Copyright Clause left such regimes untouched.  This result may appear anomalous if one 
reads the Copyright Clause to embody strong pro-public domain policies (via “limited Times” and the 
16
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss1/1
2013] THE COPYRIGHT/COMMERCE CLAUSE COLLISION 17 
Fixation, by mandating the creation of a tangible copy as a prerequisite 
to copyright, ensures that there will be something to fall into the public 
domain when the copyright term ends.86  Thus, the anti-bootlegging 
statutes’ protection of unfixed works is seen by some as a serious 
constitutional shortcoming, rather than a formalistic reading of 
“Writings.”87 
The second way in which the anti-bootlegging statutes may fall 
outside of Copyright Clause power is more straightforward 
conceptually.  As discussed above, the Copyright Clause explicitly 
requires that any rights secured last for “limited Times.”  The anti-
bootlegging statutes contain no statute of limitations, thus affording 
“arguably perpetual” protection of live musical performances.88  Though 
some commentators have argued for various interpretations of the 
statutes that avoid this problem,89 the overwhelming majority of courts 
and commentators have concluded the statute as written fails to satisfy 
the “limited Times” requirement.90  It would thus appear that the anti-
bootlegging statutes afford the kind of perpetual protection that the 
Copyright Clause expressly proscribes, and so another grant of power 
must be relied upon if they are to be upheld under the Constitution.91 
 
fixation requirement).  However, it is well-established that the Copyright Clause did not preclude state 
regulation of copyrightable subject matter, see Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 556–57 (1973) 
(“[T]he Copyright Clause . . . does not indicate that all writings are of national interest or that state 
legislation is, in all cases, unnecessary or precluded.”), at least until Congress chooses to act in the area 
and preempts state protection, id. at 559.  With the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress opted to preempt 
the operation of state copyright law once a work has been fixed in a tangible medium.  See 17 U.S.C.A. 
§ 301(a) (2012). 
 86. Joseph C. Merschman, Note, Anchoring Copyright Laws in the Copyright Clause: Halting 
the Commerce Clause End Run Around Limits on Congress’s Copyright Power, 34 CONN. L. REV. 661, 
663, 681 (2002).  A similar function is served by the Copyright Act’s deposit provisions, which impose 
fines if copies of a published work are not deposited with the Library of Congress for posterity.  17 
U.S.C. § 407(a)–(d) (2012).  
 87. See Nimmer, supra note 30, at 1385, 1409–10 (viewing the anti-bootlegging statutes as part 
of the “end of copyright”). 
 88. Id. at 1411.  
 89. For example, some commentators have argued that the anti-bootlegging statutes should be 
read to incorporate general copyright duration provisions.  E.g., Susan M. Deas, Jazzing Up the 
Copyright Act? Resolving the Uncertainties of the United States Anti-Bootlegging Law, 20 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 567, 579 (1998).  Other commentators have argued there is no “limited Times” 
problem at all since the protection, properly conceived, only persists for the limited duration of the live 
performance.  E.g., Danitz, supra note 13, at 1198–99.  While this last argument could be made with 
respect to the anti-bootlegging statutes’ prohibition on fixing a live musical performance, it is more 
difficult to see how it applies to the prohibition on distributing or selling the bootlegged performance. 
 90. Oliar, supra note 17, at 491. 
 91. This article looks only to the Commerce Clause as an alternate source of support, though 
others have argued that the anti-bootlegging statutes can be upheld instead under Treaty Clause powers.  
See supra note 34 (citing to articles that evaluate whether the Treaty Clause can support the anti-
bootlegging statutes). 
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B. Case Law 
This section provides an overview of the case law most relevant to the 
question of whether, and when, Congress may rely on Commerce Clause 
power to support copyright-like legislation that cannot be sustained 
under the Copyright Clause.  First, it discusses the Supreme Court 
precedents thought most relevant to the issue, though none of the cases 
address the question explicitly.  Next, it reviews the recent challenges to 
the constitutionality of the DMCA and the anti-bootlegging statutes that 
have been heard in the lower federal courts. 
1. Supreme Court Precedents 
The Trade-Mark Cases challenged the constitutionality of the 
Trademark Act of 187692 as beyond Congress’s enumerated powers.  
The Act, somewhat like modern trademark law, punished the fraudulent 
use and counterfeiting of marks registered with the United States.93  The 
Supreme Court struck down the law in its entirety.  It first held that the 
Act could not be supported by the Copyright Clause, since “[t]he 
ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to invention or 
discovery.”94  In language that laid the ground for Feist a century later, 
the court interpreted “Writings” to require originality,95 which many 
trademarks lack.  Finding the law outside of the Copyright Clause, the 
Court turned to the Commerce Clause.  Since the Act purported to cover 
many marks that were used solely within a single state, the Court found 
that Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce did not reach so 
far.96  Since the Court found that neither Clause supported the statute, it 
did not directly address the issue of an intellectual property law that is 
within the Commerce Clause power but fails to satisfy Copyright Clause 
limitations.  However, the analytic approach of The Trade-Mark Cases 
appears to evince the notion that each enumerated power operates 
 
 92. Trademark Act of 1876, ch. 274, 19 Stat. 141 (1876). 
 93. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879). 
 94. Id. at 94. 
 95. See id. (“[W]hile the word writings may be liberally construed . . . it is only such [works] as 
are original . . . which are to be protected.”). 
 96. Id. at 95–98.  The Court relied in particular on the fact that the 1876 Act lacked any 
jurisdictional limitation limiting its applicability only to marks used in foreign, Indian, or interstate 
commerce, id. at 96–97, such as that found in the modern trademark statute, see 15 U.S.C. § 1127 
(2012) (limiting applicability to marks used in commerce “which may lawfully be regulated by 
Congress”).  It is unclear whether such a limitation is required under post-New Deal, more expansive 
views of the Commerce Clause, which may sometimes reach purely intrastate activities.  See, e.g., 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (allowing regulation of farmer’s intrastate wheat production 
for personal consumer under Commerce Power); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995) 
(allowing regulation of intrastate activities which “substantially affect” interstate commerce). 
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independently—that is, falling short of the Copyright Clause’s 
limitations does not prohibit reliance on Commerce Clause power to 
support a copyright-like law. 
The next important Supreme Court case, Heart of Atlanta Motel v. 
United States,97 gives further support to this notion of independence of 
powers, though it arises in a legal context—civil rights—quite distinct 
from intellectual property.  Heart of Atlanta adjudged the 
constitutionality of Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which 
prohibited racial discrimination in public accommodations.98  Standing 
in the way of the Act was a post-Reconstruction precedent—the Civil 
Rights Cases99—which had struck down a similar law as outside the 
scope of Congress’s powers.100  The Civil Rights Cases held that “state 
action” was required before the power of the Fourteenth Amendment 
could be invoked,101 since the Amendment reads that “No State 
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws.”102  Declining to review that precedent, the Court upheld 
Title II under Congress’s Commerce Clause power without considering 
the impact of Fourteenth Amendment powers.103  Thus, although the 
Court deals with the conflict of enumerated powers issue only 
implicitly, Heart of Atlanta, like The Trade-Mark Cases, appears to 
endorse the proposition that enumerated powers function largely 
independently; at the least, falling short of one grant of power does not 
necessarily foreclose the use of another power.  However, given the 
unique political context of Heart of Atlanta, along with the force of stare 
decisis (i.e., the Court’s reluctance to overrule an 80-year-old 
precedent), it is unclear how much should be read into the Court’s 
approach. 
On the other side of the issue is a more recent Supreme Court case, 
Railway Labor Executives v. Gibbons,104 which made clear that the 
limitations of enumerated powers cannot be avoided through reliance on 
expansive Commerce Clause powers in all circumstances.  At issue in 
Gibbons was the Rock Island Railroad Transition and Employee 
 
 97. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
 98. Id. at 242, 247. 
 99. United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (Civil Rights Cases). 
 100. Id. at 10–14.   
 101. Id. at 13. The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees citizens “equal 
protection of the laws,” and section 5 grants Congress the “power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this article.” 
 102. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 103. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 257.  Justice Douglas wrote separately to express the view that 
legislation should instead be upheld under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 280 (Douglas, 
J., concurring). 
 104. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982). 
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Assistance Act (RITA),105 passed in response to the bankruptcy and 
anticipated liquidation of Rock Island Railroad.106  RITA decreed that 
economic benefits due to laid-off employees be treated as administrative 
expenses in bankruptcy, essentially requiring these benefits to be paid 
from the estate’s assets before the claims of other creditors were 
satisfied.107  In Gibbons, the Court first held that RITA could not be an 
exercise of Congress’s Bankruptcy Clause power, as that Clause only 
provides for the establishment of “uniform” bankruptcy laws;108 RITA, 
as a private bill affecting only one company’s reorganization, did not 
satisfy this requirement of uniformity.109  Though the United States 
never advanced the Commerce Clause as an alternate source of 
authority, the Court, in a stunning bit of dicta, went on to write that the 
Commerce Clause could not be used to eliminate a limitation in another 
enumerated power: 
[T]he Bankruptcy Clause itself contains an affirmative limitation or 
restriction upon Congress’ power: bankruptcy laws must be uniform 
throughout the United States. . . .  Thus, if we were to hold that Congress 
had the power to enact nonuniform bankruptcy laws pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause, we would eradicate from the Constitution a limitation 
on the power of Congress to enact bankruptcy laws.110 
Thus Gibbons would seem to put to rest the idea that the Commerce 
Clause can be relied upon as an independent grant of authority in all 
circumstances; clearly, the limitations of other enumerated powers 
cannot always be so avoided. 
This “trio” of cases—The Trade-Mark Cases, Heart of Atlanta Motel, 
and Gibbons—are generally considered to be the principal guidance the 
Supreme Court has offered so far.111  Unfortunately, little is clear from 
the cases other than the obvious “tension” between the holdings112 and 
the fact that none of the cases can be said to control the resolution of the 
 
 105. Pub. L. No. 96-254, 94 Stat. 399 (1980). 
 106. Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 459–61. 
 107. Id. at 461–63. 
 108. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“Congress shall have power . . . [t]o establish . . . uniform 
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States”). 
 109. Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 471 (“A law can hardly be said to be uniform . . . if it applies only to 
one debtor.”). 
 110. Id. at 468–69 (citations omitted).   
 111. See Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2007) (analyzing the Copyright/Commerce 
Clause collision by focusing on “a trio of cases—the Trade-Mark Cases, Heart of Atlanta, and 
Gibbons—in which the Supreme Court has considered issues similar to the one that confronts us”).  In 
addition to these three cases, commentators have looked to a diverse array of precedents for further 
guidance, see, e.g., Nachbar, supra note 15, at 299–308 (examining the relevance of early 20th-century 
regulatory taxation cases); Oliar, supra note 17, at 479–84 (examining the relevance of cases involving 
Congress’s borrowing powers and powers under the Militia Clause). 
 112. United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1279 (11th Cir. 1999). 
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Copyright/Commerce Clause collision.113  It is thus not too surprising 
that the lower courts have reached an array of conclusions—and 
employed a variety of conflicting standards—in adjudging the 
constitutionality of the DMCA and the anti-bootlegging statutes on 
enumerated powers grounds.  The next section summarizes this case 
law. 
2. Modern Copyright Controversies 
a. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
The principal case involving an enumerated powers challenge to the 
DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions is United States v. Elcom.114  
Elcom was the software developer of a product that allowed consumers 
to circumvent use restrictions associated with Adobe eBooks.115  
Publishers using Adobe were allowed to specify whether purchasers of 
eBooks were able to, inter alia, make copies of the eBook, print a paper 
version, or email the document to others.116  Elcom’s technology 
removed these restrictions, and Elcom was indicted under the DMCA 
for trafficking in their software.117  Before reaching the enumerated 
powers issue, the court rejected challenges to the DMCA on First 
Amendment118 and due process grounds.119  
Acknowledging the force of Gibbons, the Elcom court stated that 
“Congress may not use [Commerce Clause] power in such a way as to 
override or circumvent another constitutional restraint.”120  Influenced 
by the Moghadam case, discussed below,121 Elcom articulated the proper 
test as whether the DMCA’s use of Commerce Clause power was 
“irreconcilably inconsistent” with the Copyright Clause.122  The court 
first considered whether the DMCA’s purpose was inconsistent with the 
 
 113. See Martignon, 492 F.3d at 146 (“We find no absolute answers [in the Supreme Court 
precedents] because none of the cases . . . is directly on point.”). 
 114. United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002).  In another prominent 
case adjudging the constitutionality of the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions, the Second Circuit 
declined to reach the issue of whether Copyright Clause limitations precluded Congress’s authority to 
enact the DMCA on procedural grounds.  Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 444–45 
(2d Cir. 2001). 
 115. Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1118. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 1119. 
 118. Id. at 1125–37. 
 119. Id. at 1122–25. 
 120. Id. at 1138. 
 121. See infra notes 137–142 and accompanying text. 
 122. Elcom, 203 F. Supp. at 1140. 
21
Hickey: Copyright/Commerce Clause Collision: A Subject Matter Approach
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2014
22 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 82 
purposes of the Copyright Clause.123  Viewing anti-circumvention 
provisions as complementing the existing intellectual property regime 
by providing effective means to enforce IP rights in a digital world, the 
court found there was no serious inconsistency.124  Second, the court 
looked at the pragmatic costs and benefits of the regulation from a 
copyright perspective,125 and concluded that the alleged violations of the 
Copyright Clause were too “tenuous” to be persuasive.126  
The other case that has adjudicated a Congressional authority 
challenge to the DMCA is 321 Studios v. MGM.127  321 Studios, the 
maker and seller of software which allowed users to copy DVDs despite 
encryption protections, argued that its software was legal because, inter 
alia, the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA exceeded 
Congress’s enumerated powers.128  The court rejected this challenge, but 
relied heavily on the Elcom analysis,129 thus offering few insights 
independent of that decision.  
In summary, although no court has struck down the DMCA on 
enumerated powers grounds, there have been few cases directly 
addressing the issue, and even courts upholding the law acknowledged 
that the Copyright/Commerce Clause issue presented a “difficult 
question.”130  The next section looks at the analogous case law with 
regard to the anti-bootlegging statutes, where the courts have been more 
divided and the controversy even more acute. 
b. The Anti-Bootlegging Statutes 
Three separate cases—United States v. Moghadam,131 KISS Catalog 
v. Passport International Products,132 and United States v. 
Martignon133—have produced five published decisions on whether the 
anti-bootlegging statutes are a constitutionally valid exercise of 
congressional power.  The results have been mixed, with two decisions 
 
 123. See id. at 1140 (accepting argument that “Congress’ intent [in enacting the DMCA] was to 
protect intellectual property rights and thus promote the same purposes served by the Intellectual 
Property Clause”). 
 124. Id. at 1140–41. 
 125. See Oliar, supra note 17, at 499 (viewing the Elcom analysis as weighing “the DMCA’s 
copyright-related costs and benefits”). 
 126. Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1141. 
 127. 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 128. Id. at 1089–90. 
 129. See id. at 1103–04 (quoting Elcom at length and adopting its conclusions). 
 130. Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1138. 
 131. United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 132. KISS I, 350 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 2004), vacated by 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1171–76 
(C.D. Cal. 2005). 
 133. Martignon SDNY, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev’d, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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finding either the criminal or civil anti-bootlegging statute 
unconstitutional134 and three upholding the laws (including both 
appellate decisions).135  The facts of each case are similar—a bootlegger 
is sued or indicted, and challenges the constitutionality of the anti-
bootlegging statutes’ civil or criminal provision.  The courts all agreed 
on two central premises: (1) the anti-bootlegging statutes could not be 
sustained under the Copyright Clause, due to either a lack of fixation or 
the temporally unlimited protection;136 and (2) the Commerce Clause 
power, standing alone, would be enough to support the legislation.  They 
disagreed as to whether it was permissible, in this context, for Congress 
to avoid a Copyright Clause limitation by using Commerce Clause 
power.  Most interesting for purposes of this Article are the theories and 
rationales put forth in the opinions.  This part surveys the analytical 
approach of each decision with regard to the Copyright/Commerce 
Clause collision. 
In Moghadam, the Eleventh Circuit heard a challenge to the criminal 
anti-bootlegging statute based on the argument that the Copyright 
Clause’s “Writings” requires the subject matter protected be fixed in a 
tangible medium;137 for procedural reasons, the court did not address the 
argument that the anti-bootlegging statutes afforded perpetual protection 
in contravention of “limited Times.”138  The court assumed arguendo 
that the lack of fixation precluded the use of the Copyright Clause, 
turning directly to the issue of whether it might nonetheless be 
supported under Commerce Clause power.139  The Moghadam court 
concluded Commerce power could be validly relied upon, using two 
alternate theories.  The first theory was that the Copyright Clause’s 
“Writings” requirement was not intended as an “affirmative 
limitation”140—unlike the “uniform” requirement at issue in Gibbons 
(and, presumably, the “limited Times” requirement)—and thus did not 
preclude the use of other enumerated powers.  The second theory 
articulated the test as whether “the particular use of the Commerce 
Clause [is] fundamentally inconsistent with the particular limitation in 
 
 134. See Martignon SDNY, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 429 (finding the criminal anti-bootlegging statute 
unconstitutional); KISS I, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (finding civil anti-bootlegging statute 
unconstitutional).  
 135. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1282 (finding criminal anti-bootlegging statute constitutional); 
Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2007) (same); KISS II, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 1177 (finding civil 
anti-bootlegging statute constitutional). 
 136. There is one exception to this generalization, as the Moghadam court only heard the fixation-
based challenge (and not the “limited Times” argument), and assumed, arguendo, that the lack of 
fixation precluded reliance on the Copyright Clause.  Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1274. 
 137. Id. at 1275–77. 
 138. See id. at 1274 n.9 (explaining that Moghadam failed to preserve this argument for appeal). 
 139. Id. at 1274. 
 140. Id. at 1280. 
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the Copyright Clause.”141  Later courts—e.g., Elcom, discussed 
supra142—picked up on and followed this “fundamentally inconsistent” 
test, though Moghadam did not elaborate on what it meant by this 
language. 
The KISS Catalog cases adjudicated the constitutionality of the civil 
anti-bootlegging statute.  The first district court opinion in KISS (KISS I) 
found the law unconstitutional.  Judge Rea found it unnecessary to 
decide whether the statute violated the fixation requirement, as it clearly 
could not be supported under Copyright Clause power since the 
protection afforded was not for “limited Times.”143  Relying heavily on 
Gibbons,144 Judge Rea reasoned that allowing recourse to the Commerce 
Clause in this context would effectively write the Copyright Clause’s 
limitations out of the Constitution.145  After Judge Rea’s death, the new 
judge assigned to the case granted a motion to reconsider (after the 
United States intervened), and vacated the finding of unconstitutionality 
in KISS II.146  KISS II advanced two alternate grounds for its decision 
that Section 1101 was a valid exercise of Commerce Clause power.  The 
opinion first advanced a sweeping argument that enumerated powers 
should simply be analyzed independently: 
[O]nce the Court concludes that the Statute does not fall within the 
purview of the Copyright Clause, it need no longer consider whether it 
complies with the limitations of the Copyright Clause. . . .  One need only 
find an alternative source of constitutional authority.  This Court finds 
such authority in the Commerce Clause.147 
In the alternative, the court adopted Moghadam’s approach and held 
Section 1101 was not “fundamentally inconsistent” with the Copyright 
Clause.148  It offered several reasons to find no fundamental conflict, 
relying heavily on the notion that legislation should be presumed 
constitutional.149 
The district court opinion in Martignon (Martignon SDNY) found the 
 
 141. Id. at 1280 n.12 (emphasis added). 
 142. See supra notes 114–126 and accompanying text. 
 143. See KISS I, 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 831–33 (C.D. Cal. 2004).  Judge Rea rejected alternative 
constructions of the statute which implied a time limit from another part of the copyright code as 
unreasonable.  Id. at 832–33. 
 144. See id. at 836 (“[T]his Court finds [Gibbons] to be the most instructive case on this issue.”).  
 145. See id. at 837 (“The framers . . . included the explicit limits contained in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
Permitting the current scope of the Commerce Clause to overwhelm those limitations altogether would 
be akin to a ‘repeal’ of a provision of the Constitution.”). 
 146. See KISS II, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1171–76 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 
 147. Id. at 1175. 
 148. Id. at 1176 (“Even if a ‘fundamental conflict’ with the Copyright Clause would invalidate the 
Statute, none exists here.”). 
 149. See id. at 1175–76. 
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criminal anti-bootlegging statute unconstitutional.  Like KISS II, 
Martignon SDNY advanced two theories of the Copyright/Commerce 
Clause collision.  Judge Baer’s first theory related to whether the anti-
bootlegging statute was “copyright-like.”150  If Congress was acting 
within the copyright field, the reasoning goes, it is bound by the 
limitations of the Copyright Clause regardless of the existence of 
Commerce power.151  Baer looked to the text, history, and purpose of the 
anti-bootlegging statute to hold it was copyright-like, and therefore 
unconstitutional.152  In the alternate, Baer applied the Moghadam 
“fundamental inconsistency” test and concluded, in light of the express 
“limited Times” language, perpetual protection for live performances 
was a sufficiently serious inconsistency.153 
Though the Second Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in 
reversing Judge Baer, the court seems to adopt a version of his first 
theory, albeit in stricter form.  The test, in their view, was not whether a 
piece of legislation was “copyright-like”; rather, it was whether it was in 
fact a “copyright law.”154  The touchstone of copyright law, in the 
Second Circuit’s view, is a grant of “property rights in expression.”155  
Relying almost exclusively on the criminal nature of the anti-
bootlegging statute before it—enforced not via property rights but 
instead coercive government action—the court held it was not a 
copyright law and so the use of Commerce Clause authority was 
proper.156  The court expressly left open the question of whether the civil 
anti-bootlegging statute was constitutional under this analysis.157 
 
 150. Martignon SDNY, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 424–25 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 151. See id. at 425 (“Congress’ power to act in the copyright field is limited by the confines of the 
Copyright Clause.”). 
 152. Id. at 420–22. 
 153. Id. at 429. 
 154. See Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s cases allow the 
regulation of matters that could not be regulated under the Copyright Clause in a manner arguably 
inconsistent with that clause unless the statute is a copyright law.”) (emphasis added). 
 155. Id. at 150. 
 156. See id. at 152 (“Section 2319A does not create, bestow, or allocate property rights in 
expression [and so is not a ‘copyright law’].  We therefore conclude that it was not enacted under the 
Copyright Clause.”). 
 157. Id. at 152 n.8.  The reader may also wonder whether this analysis means that the criminal 
copyright enforcement provisions, see 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2012) (providing for criminal penalties for 
“willful” infringement of a copyright for commercial gain), must be supported by an act under the 
Commerce Clause, and not the Copyright Clause.  The issue may be resolved by recognizing that 
“copyright law” is used in this context as a term of art—defining laws so similar to copyright that they 
must be scrutinized to comply with the Copyright Clause’s limitations—and is not coincidental with the 
limit of Congress’s “necessary and proper” powers under the Copyright Clause.  See infra Part V.B.1.b 
(explaining this point in more detail). 
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III. THE CONTOURS OF THE DEBATE 
As the preceding Part illustrates, the courts have taken a diverse and 
conflicting set of approaches to the Copyright/Commerce Clause 
collision.  As we will see in greater detail later, this diversity extends to 
the views of the legal commentators who have examined the issue.158  
Before organizing and examining these theories, it is useful to set out 
the boundaries of the debate.  This Part argues that the views at either 
end of the spectrum—complete independence of powers on the one 
hand, and complete external application of the Copyright Clause’s 
limitations on the other—cannot be supported on any reasonable reading 
of the applicable Supreme Court precedents.  Though the simplicity of 
each of these views may be initially appealing, this Article contends that 
any doctrinally sound theory of the Copyright/Commerce Clause 
collision must be more nuanced.  In other words, the proper question is 
not whether a Copyright Clause limitation ought to apply to the use of 
Commerce Clause power, but when such a limitation must apply.  Any 
theory offered to answer this question must define some closed set of 
circumstances under which a given Copyright Clause limitation will be 
applied to exercises of other enumerated powers if it is to be consistent 
with the precedents this Part analyzes. 
A. The Independence-of-Powers View 
Based on a naïve textual reading of Article I, Section 8 of the 
Constitution—which lists the enumerated powers of Congress—one 
view of the Copyright/Commerce Clause collision would simply read 
each grant of power in Section 8 as operating independently.  After all, 
each grant of power is listed separately, and makes no explicit reference 
to any other enumerated power.  Why should we read limitations into 
the Commerce Clause that are not written into the Commerce Clause?  
The strongest language in KISS II,159 as well as that of some 
commentators,160 takes this view of the issue. 
This “independence-of-powers” view, despite its textual appeal, 
cannot be easily reconciled with much of the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional intellectual property jurisprudence.  It is difficult to 
understand why the Supreme Court in Feist expended so much energy 
articulating a constitutional originality requirement if “sweat of the 
brow” protection could simply be had via reliance on the Commerce 
 
 158. See infra Part IV (reviewing and organizing theories offered in legal commentary). 
 159. See supra notes 146–149 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning in KISS II). 
 160. See, e.g., Gerdes, supra note 14, at 1468 (“[T]he Commerce Clause is not limited by less-
than-explicit prohibitions in other constitutional clauses.”). 
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Clause.161  The fact that Congress was clearly exercising Copyright 
Clause power in the provisions of the Copyright Act at issue in Feist is 
not enough to distinguish the case.  As a matter of black letter 
constitutional law, Congress’s stated basis of authority is irrelevant in 
assessing a law’s constitutionality;162 courts are to look to all the 
possible sources of congressional power regardless of how Congress 
purports to justify a law.  Nor can Feist be distinguished on the ground 
that a Commerce power argument was not raised.  Principles of 
constitutional avoidance163 would seem to require that courts at least 
look to potential Commerce Clause authority before laying down a 
constitutional rule.  The Feist court never discussed the Commerce 
Clause, strongly suggesting that it viewed the Copyright Clause as 
completely governing the issue. 
To a similar effect as Feist is Graham v. John Deere Company, which 
held a certain level of innovation (i.e., of non-obviousness) to be a 
constitutional requirement for the issuance of a patent.164  Graham 
seems particularly in conflict with an independence-of-powers view as it 
dealt with an act of Congress (unlike the judicial interpretations at issue 
in Feist) which appeared to lower the threshold of non-obviousness 
required for patentability.165  Making clear that a particular level of 
innovation (or more) was required by the Constitution’s requirement 
that patents “promote the progress of . . . useful Arts,”166 the Court 
interpreted a provision of the 1952 Patent Act to avoid a constitutional 
violation.167  If Commerce Clause authority was available to support the 
legislation, one would assume that the Graham court would have looked 
to this power before invalidating (or at least materially altering) a 
congressional action. 
Perhaps most fatal to the independence-of-powers view is the 
Supreme Court’s approach in Dastar Corporation v. Twentieth Century 
 
 161. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the holding in Feist). 
 162. See Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948) (“[T]he constitutionality of 
action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise.”). 
 163. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345–49 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring) (listing principles of constitutional avoidance).  
 164. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966). 
 165. Id. at 3–4 (“The questions . . . before us, [include] what effect the 1952 Act had upon 
traditional statutory and judicial tests of patentability . . . .  We have concluded that . . . the general level 
of innovation necessary to sustain patentability remains the same.”). 
 166. See id. at 6 (“Innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge 
are inherent requisites in a patent system which by constitutional command must ‘promote the Progress 
of . . . useful Arts.’ This is the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored.”) (citing 
A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)). 
 167. See id. at 13–17 (rejecting the view that § 103 of the 1952 Act was intended to lower the 
level of non-obviousness required for patentability and instead construing the statute as enacting judicial 
views of non-obviousness). 
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Fox Film Corporation.168  At issue in Dastar was how a particular use 
of Commerce Clause authority—Section 43 of the Lanham Act169—
should be interpreted.  Fox charged that Dastar, by editing and selling a 
public domain documentary without any attribution to the author, had 
misrepresented the “origin” of goods in violation of the Lanham Act.170  
Since the Lanham Act is clearly an exercise of Commerce Clause 
power, the independence-of-powers approach would see the Copyright 
Clause as having no relevance to the statutory construction issue in 
Dastar.  To the contrary, the Dastar Court interpreted the Lanham Act 
with an eye towards avoiding a potential Copyright Clause conflict.171  
The court read “origin” to mean physical source—and not original 
authorship—since “[t]o hold otherwise would be akin to finding that 
§ 43(a) created a species of perpetual patent and copyright, which 
Congress may not do.”172  Dastar is thus powerful evidence that the 
limitations of the Copyright Clause have relevance to the exercise of 
Congress’s Commerce Clause powers. 
B. Broad External Application of Copyright Clause Limitations 
At the other end of the spectrum is the view that the Copyright 
Clause’s limitations ought to apply broadly to any exercise of 
congressional power that is patent- or copyright-like.  This is the strong 
form of the district court opinion in Martignon,173 and a few 
commentators have taken such a hard-line approach.174  The difficulty of 
this view—if terms like “copyright-like” are given a reasonably broad 
meaning—is that it is almost impossible to reconcile with the existence 
of federal trademark and trade secret protection.  As discussed above, 
federal trademark law, though a species of intellectual property that 
affords rights in expression, is well accepted as a valid exercise of 
Commerce Clause power.175  Though trade secret is principally a 
 
 168. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
 169. Id. at 31.  See also supra notes 46–52 (explaining how Lanham Act is understood today as a 
valid exercise of Commerce Clause power). 
 170. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 25–27. 
 171. See id. at 34 (“[I]n construing the Lanham Act, we have been ‘careful to caution against 
misuse or over-extension’ of trademark and related protections into areas traditionally occupied by 
patent or copyright.”) (citing TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001)). 
 172. Id. at 37. 
 173. See supra notes 150–153 (discussing the district court decision in Martignon).  
 174. See, e.g., Patton, supra note 13, at 1298–99 (agreeing with Martignon’s “copyright-like” 
approach and taking expansive view on when legislation is “within the scope of the Copyright Clause”).  
Patton notes that the existence of federal trademarks mean that “[n]ot all ‘copyright-like’ 
legislation . . . will necessary fall within the scope of the Copyright Clause,” id. at 1302, but it is unclear 
why this conclusion should not follow from his analysis. 
 175. See supra Part II.A.1. 
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creature of state law,176 Congress has afforded some federal protection 
for trade secrets through the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (the 
EEA).177  The EEA creates criminal penalties for the misappropriation 
of another company’s trade secrets,178 thus granting protection for 
certain economically valuable ideas.  If the “intellectual property-like” 
approach is taken literally, the EEA would rest on suspect constitutional 
grounds as it does not comport with the limitations of the Copyright 
(and Patent179) Clause—it affords potentially perpetual protection in 
ideas to individuals (the owners of trade secrets) who are not necessarily 
inventors or authors.  However, like federal trademark protection, it is 
widely assumed that federal trade secret law is a valid exercise of 
Commerce Clause power.180  The Supreme Court’s analysis in Kewanee 
Oil Corporation v. Bicron Corporation, which upheld state trade secret 
law as not preempted by federal patent law or the Copyright Clause,181 is 
suggestive of this conclusion.  The Kewanee court took the view that 
trade secret and patent operated harmoniously within their separate 
spheres,182 and thus trade secret did not seriously violate the purposes 
and limitations of patent law and the Copyright Clause.183 
Given that neither the independence-of-powers nor a broad 
“copyright-like” view can be easily maintained, any approach to the 
Copyright/Commerce Clause collision must satisfy a few broad criteria 
if it is to be consistent with Supreme Court precedent.  In particular, 
such a theory must set forth principles which define some sphere—
narrow enough to exclude trademark, but broad enough to include core 
Copyright Act and patent laws like those in Feist and Graham—where 
Copyright Clause limitations will apply.  Professor Thomas Nachbar is 
correct in that the question is one of external application across 
enumerated powers, a distinction “between limits that are internal to a 
particular constitutional provision and limits that apply throughout the 
 
 176. Heald & Sherry, supra note 15, at 1194. 
 177. Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839 (2012)). 
 178. See 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (2012) (prohibiting unauthorized appropriation of trade secrets). 
 179. Though I have used “Copyright Clause” as a shorthand for Article I, section 8, clause 8 
throughout this piece, the constitutional provision is more completely named as the “Copyright/Patent 
Clause” since it forms the basis of congressional power for both areas of the law—i.e., protection for 
both “Writings” (copyright) and “Discoveries” (patent).  See supra note 24 (establishing this shorthand).  
Since the EEA provides protection for ideas, it is more nearly “patent-like” than “copyright-like.”  
 180. Heald & Sherry, supra note 15, at 1194–95 (using federal trade secret law as example of 
valid use of Commerce Clause power); Patry, supra note 16, at 394 (same). 
 181. Kewanee Oil Corp. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474 (1974). 
 182. See id. at 493 (“Trade secret law and patent law have co-existed in this country for over one 
hundred years. Each has its particular role to play, and the operation of one does not take away from the 
need for the other.”). 
 183. Id. at 480–92. 
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Constitution or are, for lack of a better term, external.”184  But Nachbar 
is incorrect to view the internal versus external distinction as an all-or-
nothing inquiry—i.e., that a Copyright Clause limitation must either 
(like the First Amendment) apply to all congressional actions, or instead 
solely to exercises of the Copyright Clause.185  It is certainly possible 
that a particular Copyright Clause limitation will be applied externally to 
some uses of other enumerated powers and not to others.  In fact, as this 
Part argues, defining such a sphere of applicability is the only way to 
make sense of Supreme Court precedent.  
IV. THEORIES OF THE COPYRIGHT/COMMERCE CLAUSE CONFLICT 
This Part reviews and analyzes the principal theories of the 
Copyright/Commerce Clause collision that have been offered in the case 
law and legal commentary, organizing them into five broad categories: 
(1) structural analogies; (2) textualist theories; (3) purpose-based 
theories; (4) values-based theories; and (5) subject matter theories.  This 
organization synthesizes a voluminous academic literature, and offers a 
novel way to understand the strengths and shortcomings of the 
competing theories. 
A. Structural Analogy 
Structural-analogy theories typically argue for broad external 
application of the Copyright Clause’s limitations by likening the 
Copyright Clause to other constitutional provisions which have been 
applied to uses of the Commerce Clause or other congressional 
powers.186  For example, former Professor William Patry’s analysis 
relies heavily on Professor Laurence Tribe’s work on the Treaty 
Clause.187  Tribe argued that Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution—
which requires treaties to be approved by a two-thirds majority of the 
Senate—precluded reliance on usual Article I powers to approve treaties 
by a simple majority of both houses.188  Patry, in an influential law 
review article, draws an analogy between the Treaty Clause and the 
Copyright Clause, arguing that the Copyright Clause’s limitations ought 
 
 184. Nachbar, supra note 15, at 297. 
 185. Id. at 295–98. 
 186. This “structural” categorization draws on related analyses offered by two other scholars.  See 
Oliar, supra note 17, at 500–01 (discussing “structural inference” approaches); Nachbar, supra note 15, 
at 287–94 (discussing legal academia’s “rhetoric of structure”). 
 187. Patry, supra note 16, at 375–76.   
 188. See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1249–78 (1995) (arguing that procedures laid 
on its Constitution’s Treaty Clause provide exclusive procedure for congressional approval of treaties). 
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to apply externally as well—precluding, in his view, federal database 
protection.189  Professors Pollack, Heald, and Sherry have relied on a 
similar analogy to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the Tenth and 
Eleventh Amendments, which have been held to limit the exercise of 
Commerce Clause power based on federalism principles.190 
There are two serious problems with a structural-analogy approach.  
First, the worth of these arguments is heavily dependent on one’s view 
of the relevance and merit of the underlying analogy.  All of these 
analogies will be imperfect since they rely on distinct constitutional 
contexts, and one can rather easily pick and choose analogies to advance 
one’s own policy interests.191  As a result, it is unclear that these 
analogies really further the debate.  Second, and more fundamentally, 
the structural-analogy view offers an incomplete theory of the 
Copyright/Commerce Clause collision.  Structural analogies, by their 
nature, can only answer the question of whether—yes or no—Copyright 
Clause limitations should be applied externally.  However, as Part III 
argued, the answer to this question—“sometimes”—is already clear 
from controlling Supreme Court precedents in the intellectual property 
context; there is thus no need to rely on distinct areas of constitutional 
jurisprudence.  The true issue in the debate is when Copyright Clause 
limitations will apply externally and when they will not, and structural 
analogies do little to answer this critical question. 
B. Textualist Theory 
Another theory of the Copyright/Commerce Clause collision 
examines the text of the Copyright Clause and attempts to distinguish 
between two types of restrictions on enumerated powers: those that 
represent a simple “lack of authority” to legislate, and those that are 
“affirmative limitations” on constitutional power.  Only the affirmative 
limitations, the argument goes, will apply externally to uses of other 
congressional powers.  This “textualist” theory stems from an attempt to 
reconcile the different outcomes in Gibbons and Heart of Atlanta, 
relying on the following distinction.192  The Bankruptcy Clause’s 
 
 189. Patry, supra note 16, at 375–76, 395–97. 
 190. See Malla Pollack, Unconstitutional Incontestability? The Intersection of the Intellectual 
Property and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution: Beyond a Critique of Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar 
Corp., 18 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 259, 270–74 (1995) (drawing comparison between Copyright Clause 
and Tenth Amendment limitations on Commerce Clause power); Heald & Sherry, supra note 15, at 
1124 (finding Tenth and Eleventh Amendment federalism decisions as “very instructive” with regard to 
Copyright/Commerce Clause collision). 
 191. See Oliar, supra note 17, at 501 (“[C]ommentators applying structural inference [have] 
reached opposite conclusions . . . based on the context from which they chose to analogize.”). 
 192. See Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 147–48 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining this argument). 
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“uniform” requirement, at issue in Gibbons, is an affirmative limitation 
on congressional power; it requires all bankruptcy laws to be uniform.193  
In contrast, the Fourteenth Amendment—at issue in Heart of Atlanta—
contains no such express limitations; the “state action” requirement of 
the Civil Rights Cases is merely a jurisdictional restriction that indicates 
a lack of authority.194  As a result, the “uniformity” requirement applies 
to exercises of other congressional powers, but the “state action” 
requirement does not.  This textualist argument was advanced forcefully 
at the appellate level in Martignon,195 and some language in Moghadam 
suggests reliance on the theory.196 
The essential failure of the textualist approach is that it offers no clear 
way to distinguish between affirmative limitations and jurisdictional 
bounds on grants of power.  Consider, for example, the Copyright 
Clause’s provision that the rights secured be vested in “Authors,” which 
has been interpreted to mean that only original works may be 
copyrighted.197  On the one hand, it is easy to argue this is a Gibbons-
like affirmative limitation—just as the Bankruptcy Clause requires 
bankruptcy laws to be uniform, so the Copyright Clause requires 
copyrighted works to be original.  But one could just as easily argue that 
“Authors” is a jurisdictional requirement.  On this view, “Authors” 
indicates that the Copyright Clause only covers original works, just as 
the Fourteenth Amendment only relates to “state actions;” thus, the 
Copyright Clause simply lacks authority over unoriginal works.  This 
insight has been stated more generally by Professor Nachbar: “Because 
the federal government is one of enumerated powers, it is easy to restate 
any ‘affirmative limitation’ on a grant of Congress’s power as a ‘lack of 
authority to legislate,’ and vice versa.”198  In other words, any lack of 
authority in an enumerated power functions as a limitation on 
Congress’s power.  Textualist theories thus offer little insight into which 
exercises of Commerce Clause power will be subject to Copyright 
Clause limitations. 
C. Purpose-Based Approaches  
A third group of theories answers the question of when the Copyright 
 
 193. See supra notes 104–110 (explaining the facts and holding of Gibbons). 
 194. See supra notes 97–103 (explaining the facts and holding of Heart of Atlanta). 
 195. Martignon, 492 F.3d at 145, 147–48. 
 196. See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1280 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Copyright 
Clause does not envision that Congress is positively forbidden from extending copyright-like protection 
[to unfixed works]. The grant itself is stated in positive terms, and does not imply any negative pregnant 
that suggests that the term “Writings” operates as a ceiling. . . .”). 
 197. See supra notes 53–58 (explaining the Feist decision). 
 198. Nachbar, supra note 15, at 295. 
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Clause’s limitations ought to apply to the Commerce Clause by 
reference to either the purposes underlying each grant of power, or 
Congress’s aim in enacting the legislation at issue.  Versions of this 
approach abound in academic commentary.199  One variation on this 
theory employs notions of purpose to classify legislation as an exercise 
of one power or the other;200 another version incorporates purpose to 
weigh the harm done to a particular clause’s goals against the valid 
exercise of the other power.201 
For example, Andrew Hetherington offers a straightforward version 
of a purpose-based approach.202  Hetherington argues that the resolution 
of the Copyright/Commerce Clause conflict lies in “the relationship 
between the constitutional purposes of the respective clauses.”203  
Determining whether Copyright Clause limitations apply will depend on 
whether, for a given law, the purpose of “promot[ing] the Progress of 
Science” under the Copyright Clause predominates over the purpose of 
“enabling free trade” under the Commerce Clause.204 
A more sophisticated version of a purpose-based approach was 
articulated recently by Professor Jeanne Fromer.  Professor Fromer’s 
theory, like Hetherington’s, looks to the purpose of the challenged 
legislation as triggering the limitations of the Copyright Clause: “when 
legislation has the structural purpose of promoting the progress of 
science and useful arts, it must restrict itself to the means specified in 
the [Copyright] Clause.”205  There is an important caveat, however, for 
laws that have multiple purposes.  If clear and convincing evidence 
shows that Congress intentionally chose to supersede the Copyright 
Clause’s limitations pursuant to a legitimate, alternative purpose (say, 
regulating a national economy), then the law is constitutional.206   
Purpose-based approaches succeed in the abstract, in that they 
articulate general principles which may yield an appropriate sphere of 
 
 199. See, e.g., Danitz, supra note 13, at 1149 (arguing that “Congress’ discretion to enact 
copyright-like protections is restricted only where the ‘essential’ purpose of the Copyright Clause is 
threatened”).  See also infra notes 200–201 (citing to other purpose-based theories). 
 200. See Merschman, supra note 86, at 689 (“[T]he key question [in the Copyright/Commerce 
Clause collision] is, under which power does this legislation truly belong? The answer to that question 
lies in the purposes behind different powers.”).  
 201. See Bathaee, supra note 13, at 507 (advocating a balancing test that weighs “how vital the 
doctrine being circumvented is to the constitutional provision in which it originates from . . . against the 
burden it will place on the [other] constitutional power”). 
 202. See generally Andrew M. Hetherington, Comment, Constitutional Purpose and Inter-Clause 
Conflict: The Constraints Imposed on Congress by the Copyright Clause, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. 
L. REV. 457 (2003). 
 203. Id. at 460. 
 204. Id. at 504–05. 
 205. Fromer, supra note 15, at 1333.   
 206. Fromer, supra note 15, at 1376–77. 
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applicability for the Copyright Clause’s limitations.  But a purpose-
based approach simply shifts the existing debate to a different level: 
What are, precisely, the purposes of the Copyright and Commerce 
Clauses?  The text of the Copyright Clause offers some guidance, in that 
its preamble specifies its intention that Congress may act only “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”207  But the Copyright 
Clause is unusual in this respect; the Commerce Clause states only that 
Congress may “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”208  Is 
its purpose to create a uniform commercial law?  To promote economic 
prosperity?  The history of each clause’s enactment and common law 
background will provide some answers to these questions, of course, 
though they are likely to be contested ones. 
Even more contentious will be the inquiry as to when one clause’s 
purpose should “take precedence” over another,209 how to classify 
congressional action with multiple purposes,210 or when a particular 
piece of legislation is so violative of the Copyright Clause’s purposes so 
as to prohibit reliance on another power.211  For example, consider 
federal trade secret legislation.  Is the purpose of such protection to 
promote fair competition (presumably a legitimate Commerce clause 
aim) or to encourage innovation (in which case Copyright Clause limits 
apply)?212  There is no obvious answer.  Similar indeterminacy arises 
when purpose-based views are applied to the anti-bootlegging statutes.  
In the view of some commentators, these statutes “complement” 
Copyright Clause purposes by protecting unfixed as well as fixed 
works;213 according to others, they undermine core copyright values by 
granting perpetual protection without requiring creation of a fixed copy 
to fall into the public domain.214  At best, a purpose-based approach runs 
a risk of being indeterminate; at worst, looking to debatable notions of 
purpose may invite courts to impose their normative view of a piece of 
 
 207. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 208. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 209. See Hetherington, supra note 202, at 505 (advocating case-by-case approach in which courts 
determine which clause’s purpose “takes precedence over the other”).  
 210. See Fromer, supra note 15, at 1376–77 (proposing burden-shifting framework for evaluating 
constitutionality of laws with multiple purposes). 
 211. See Bathaee, supra note 13, at 507 (advocating a balancing test in which courts engage in 
such an inquiry). 
 212. See S. REP. NO. 104-359, § 2 (1996) (describing purposes of EEA as both to protect 
proprietary commercial information from misappropriation, and to secure exclusive rights in authors). 
 213. See Giuliano, supra note 13, at 377 (“Properly understood, the federal anti-bootlegging 
statute protects copyright, commerce, and free speech concerns by complementing, rather than 
undermining, the Copyright Clause.”). 
 214. See Merschman, supra note 86, at 681–89 (arguing that the fixation requirement is a 
constitutional, fundamental part of Copyright Clause purposes which Congress can not avoid through 
reliance on Commerce Clause power). 
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legislation into the Copyright/Commerce Clause inquiry. 
D. Values-Based Theories 
The next group of theories attempts to identify particular normative 
value(s) that, when implicated, mandate the external application of 
Copyright Clause limitations.  This Part reviews three such theories, one 
drawn from the case law and two others that have been advanced in 
leading law review articles. 
1. “Fundamental Inconsistency” 
The Moghadam court—the first modern court to be confronted with 
the Copyright/Commerce Clause collision—summarized its conclusions 
in the following language: “[T]he Commerce Clause can provide the 
source of Congressional power in this case because the extension of 
copyright-like protection here is not fundamentally inconsistent with the 
fixation requirement of the Copyright Clause.”215  This “fundamentally 
inconsistent” test has since become a common view in the case law.  
The decisions in KISS II, Elcom, and the district court in Martignon 
have all relied upon notions of fundamental inconsistency in their 
analysis.216 
Despite its prevalence, “fundamental inconsistency” has been given 
no agreed-upon substantive meaning, causing courts to fall back on 
other approaches.  Most of the analysis in Moghadam relied on textual 
notions to reach its conclusion, arguing that “Writings,” properly 
understood, was not an “affirmative limitation” at all.217  In contrast, 
Elcom looked to the purposes of the Copyright and Commerce Clauses 
and the DMCA’s copyright-related costs and benefits.218  The district 
court in Martignon—perhaps recognizing the ambiguous nature of the 
phrase—appeared to equate “fundamentally inconsistent” and 
“inconsistent,” finding the Moghadam test satisfied because the 
Copyright Clause required a durational limitation and anti-bootlegging 
 
 215. United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). 
 216. See KISS II, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“Even if a ‘fundamental conflict’ 
with the Copyright Clause would invalidate the Statute, none exists here.”); Martignon SDNY, 346 F. 
Supp. 2d 413, 428–29 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (arguing that anti-bootlegging statute is “fundamentally 
inconsistent” with Copyright Clause’s “limited Times” requirement); United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 
F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1138–41 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (stating and applying test of “whether the DMCA is 
nevertheless ‘irreconcilably inconsistent’ with a limitation contained within the Intellectual Property 
Clause.”). 
 217. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1280. 
 218. Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1138–41. 
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statute did not have one.219  But a simple “inconsistency” test will 
always result in a finding of unconstitutionality.  Any instance of a 
Copyright/Commerce Clause collision necessarily involves an 
inconsistency, in that the Copyright Clause contains a limitation or 
requirement that the legislation at issue fails to satisfy.   
Without more substantive content, the “fundamental inconsistency” 
test does little more than restate the problem.  Because any instance of a 
Copyright/Commerce Clause conflict involves an “inconsistency,” the 
crux of the issue is when this inconsistency is “fundamental.”  
Answering that question would seem to require reliance on some outside 
authority—the purpose, text, or history of the Copyright and Commerce 
Clauses, policy judgments, etc.  Typically, then, the invocation of a 
“fundamental inconsistency” test merely masks reliance on one of the 
other theories presented in this Part, or a court’s normative approval or 
disapproval of the legislation.  The array of differing conclusions in the 
case law about which conflicts are or are not “fundamental” provides 
strong evidence for this conclusion.220 
2. “Constitutional Norms” 
Professor Thomas Nachbar, in one of the leading articles on the 
Copyright/Commerce Clause collision, argues that Copyright Clause 
limitations do not in any way restrain Congress’s exercise of Commerce 
Clause power.221  Nachbar’s theory draws a line between constitutional 
limitations like the First Amendment, or notions of federalism found in 
the Tenth Amendment—which, he agrees, are generally applicable to all 
exercises of Congressional power222—and many other limitations in 
enumerated powers that do not merit such external application.  For 
example, the Piracy Clause grants Congress the power to punish 
“Felonies committed on the high Seas,”223 but no one seriously suggests 
this phrase limits the ability of Congress to punish land-based felonies 
pursuant to its Commerce powers.224  The distinguishing factor between 
these two extremes, in Nachbar’s view, is the notion of a “constitutional 
norm,” which he defines as “a rule required by and even inherent in the 
form of government adopted in the Constitution.”225  Nachbar’s central 
 
 219. Martignon SDNY, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 428–29. 
 220. See infra notes 131–157. 
 221. See Nachbar, supra note 15, at 277 (“The Intellectual Property Clause and its limits do not 
represent generally applicable constitutional norms and Congress may therefore legislate pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause without regard to the Intellectual Property Clause or its limits.”). 
 222. Id. at 291, 297 (noting these provisions are applied to all exercises of congressional power).  
 223. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 224. Nachbar, supra note 15, at 295. 
 225. Id. at 317. 
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claim is that only limitations which rise to the level of a constitutional 
norm merit external application.  After an examination of the history of 
the Copyright Clause, Nachbar concludes it contains no such 
constitutional norms, and so the limitations of the Copyright Clause 
have no relevance to exercises of Commerce Clause power to enact 
copyright-like legislation.226 
Though Nachbar makes a forceful case for his conclusion, there are 
several problems in his analysis.  First, as noted above, it is rather 
difficult to understand the holdings of Supreme Court precedents like 
Dastar, Feist, and Graham on a complete independence-of-powers view 
(which, functionally, Nachbar’s argument represents).227  Gibbons 
presents particular problems for Nachbar, though he takes pains to 
attempt to distinguish the case.228  Given the result in Gibbons, Nachbar 
concedes—as he must—that the Bankruptcy Clause’s “uniformity” 
requirement represents a “constitutional norm.”229  But if uniform 
bankruptcy laws are “inherent in the form of government adopted in the 
Constitution,” it is hard to see why, for example, time-limited copyright 
laws are not equally inherent. 
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of Nachbar’s analysis is that his all-
or-nothing framing of the question seems tailored to lead to his 
conclusion.  As alluded to above,230 Nachbar is correct to consider the 
Copyright/Commerce Clause collision as a question of when limitations 
will be externally applied.  However, there is no a priori basis to 
conclude that limitations on enumerated powers must be divided into 
only two groups, those which are constitutional norms (and so externally 
applicable to all exercises of congressional power), and those which are 
not (and so never externally applicable).  No one seriously contends 
that, for example, the “limited Times” provision of the Copyright Clause 
means that all congressional actions shall be durationally-limited in the 
same way that the First Amendment implies that all congressional action 
not abridge the freedom of speech.  The claim, rather, is that the 
Copyright Clause’s limitations should apply to some limited sphere of 
congressional action within the clause’s purview.  In short, there is no 
reason to believe that a limitation must rise to the level of a 
 
 226. See id. at 329–50, 361 (examining history surrounding enactment of Intellectual Property 
Clause and concluding “there is no way to locate in either Supreme Court precedent or constitutional 
history a sufficiently strong countervailing constitutional norm to warrant the external application of the 
Intellectual Property Clause’s limits”). 
 227. See supra Part III.A (detailing difficulties of reconciling an independence-of-powers view 
with prominent Supreme Court precedents). 
 228. Nachbar, supra note 15, at 314–17. 
 229. See id. at 316–17 (“[T]he Court [in Gibbons] perceived the uniformity requirement as 
mirroring an explicit (and therefore generally applicable) limitation . . . .”). 
 230. See supra Part III.B. 
37
Hickey: Copyright/Commerce Clause Collision: A Subject Matter Approach
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2014
38 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 82 
constitutional norm to be, in some limited degree, externally applicable. 
3. Fundamental Intellectual Property Principles 
A final values-based theory—prominently advanced by Professors 
Heald and Sherry231—looks to “principles” embodied in the Copyright 
Clause to define certain limitations which absolutely constrain 
congressional power.232  Relying on history and common law 
surrounding the enactment of the Constitution, Heald and Sherry find 
four “principles of constitutional weight” embedded in the Copyright 
Clause.  These principles, they argue, cannot be violated by Congress in 
the exercise of any of its powers.233  The first such principle—termed 
the “Suspect Grant Principle”—provides a jurisdictional restriction on 
the theory: the limitations defined by the other three principles apply 
only to “legislation that imposes monopoly-like costs on the public 
through the granting of exclusive rights.”234  The other three principles 
define substantive limits when Congress acts in this area, and require 
that (1) exclusive rights only be granted if the public secures a 
countervailing benefit in return (the Quid Pro Quo Principle);235 (2) 
rights may only be granted to authors of new creation (the Authorship 
Principle);236 and (3) the public domain must remain inviolate (the 
Public Domain Principle).237 
Heald and Sherry amass an impressive quantity of historical evidence 
in support of their conclusions.238  Functionally, their “Suspect Grant 
Principle” may operate in much the same way as the subject matter 
 
 231. See generally Heald & Sherry, supra note 15. 
 232. There is some superficial similarity between the approach of Heald and Sherry and the 
purpose-based approaches discussed in Part IV.C, supra, in that both inquire into underlying policies 
behind the Copyright Clause.  However, Heald and Sherry’s analysis is far more complete than the 
typical invocation of “purpose,” in that they have completely specified the values they believe are 
involved.  Thus, I have chosen to classify their argument as a “values-based” approach, though, of 
course, the lines between these categories are to some degree artificial. 
 233. See Heald & Sherry, supra note 15, at 1123 (“[W]e examine the underlying history and 
structure of the Intellectual Property Clause in order to determine which of its limits are so fundamental 
that they should absolutely constrain Congress’s power . . . we call [these limitations] ‘principles of 
constitutional weight.’”). 
 234. Id. at 1160. 
 235. See id. at 1162 (“Congress may grant exclusive rights only if the grant is an attempt to secure 
a countervailing benefit to the public.  We refer to this as the Quid Pro Quo Principle.”). 
 236. See id. at 1164 (“[T]he Authorship Principle demands that Congress initially direct exclusive 
grants to those who provide the public with the new creation.”). 
 237. See id. at 1165 (“The principle of an inviolable public domain is the necessary implication of 
the constant emphasis in history and in precedent—and in the wording of the Clause itself—on the 
requirement that grants be for a limited time.”). 
 238. See id. at 1130–60 (examining wide array of historical sources to support proffered principles 
of constitutional weight). 
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approach for which this Article advocates.  But it will do so in a 
curiously circuitous and needless complex manner, as Heald and 
Sherry’s three substantive principles appear to largely trace the 
limitations traditionally understood to be embodied in the language of 
the Copyright Clause.239  Resort to “fundamental principles” derived 
from historical analysis is not needed when one can reach the same 
result directly from the text of the Copyright Clause.  For example, 
recourse to a historical “Authorship Principle” is unnecessary when one 
can simply cite the express text of the Copyright Clause, which provides 
that rights be granted only to “Authors.”  Moreover, reliance on 
contested historical analysis—as opposed to express textual command—
may run a risk of undermining the intellectual property principles Heald 
and Sherry clearly believe in.  Despite this non-trivial difference in 
form, however, the Heald and Sherry theory will often, in practice, reach 
similar conclusions as the subject matter approach for which this Article 
advocates. 
E. Subject Matter Approaches 
The last group of theories defines when Copyright Clause limitations 
will apply externally by reference to the material being regulated and the 
specific rights granted over that material, that is, the subject matter of 
the challenged law.  An expansive subject matter approach is 
exemplified by the district court opinion in Martignon, which held 
Copyright Clause limitations applicable whenever a piece of legislation 
is “copyright-like.”240  The problem with this approach—depending on 
how broadly the phrase “copyright-like” is defined—is that, taken 
literally, it would seem to render federal trademark and trade secret 
protection unconstitutional.241   
The Second Circuit’s opinion in Martignon relied on a narrower 
subject-matter-based approach, holding that Copyright Clause 
limitations apply only to “copyright laws,” which it defines as acts 
which “create, bestow, or allocate property rights in expression.”242  
 
 239. See supra notes 24–31 and accompanying text (explaining four limitations generally 
understood to be required by the text of the Copyright Clause). 
 240. See Martignon SDNY, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 424–25 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“In order to give 
meaning to the express limitations provided in the Copyright Clause, when enacting copyright-like 
legislation . . . Congress may not . . . enact the law under a separate grant of power . . . .”). 
 241. See supra Part III.B. 
 242. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 150 (2d Cir. 2007).  The Martignon court took pains to note that it 
did not mean to “cast doubt” upon the constitutionality of the Lanham Act with this definition, even 
though the Act “might be thought to allocate property rights in (unoriginal) expression.” See Martignon, 
492 F.3d at 150 n.6.  The Martignon court indicated it did not believe the Lanham Act could be 
considered a “copyright law” under this definition, though it did not elaborate on its reasoning.  Id.  For 
an explanation for why federal trademark law should not be considered a “copyright law” under the 
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Following on the Martignon decision, Professor Aaron Perzanowski has 
articulated a categorical subject matter approach, arguing that Copyright 
Clause limitations apply whenever Congress grants “exclusive rights in 
expression.”243  For the reasons expressed in the next Part, this Article 
agrees that a subject matter approach offers the best resolution of the 
conflict between the Copyright and Commerce Clause.  However, the 
shortcoming of both Martignon and Perzanowski’s formulation is that 
they leave the precise scope of “exclusive rights in expression” 
undefined, leading to sharply different results in the application of their 
tests.244  By contrast, this Article’s proposal offers a more nuanced 
subject matter test, articulating several factors that determine when a 
law grants property rights in expression.  The details of this proposal are 
explored in the next Part. 
V. DEFINING THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE’S SUBJECT MATTER 
This Part justifies and elaborates upon the subject matter approach.  
The first section argues that tying Copyright Clause limitations to a 
limited subject matter is a workable approach which offers the most 
defensible understanding of key precedents.  Functionally, it operates to 
protect core copyright values within their traditional sphere, preventing 
the dilution that might result from broader applicability.  The second 
section more fully elaborates on the factors that constitute the “copyright 
law” inquiry: the activities proscribed, the material protected, and the 
specific rights granted. 
A. The Virtues of a Subject Matter Approach 
1. Protecting Constitutional Copyright Principles 
Courts and commentators who oppose the anti-bootlegging statutes or 
database protection frequently remark that allowing Congress to rely on 
the Commerce Clause to uphold copyright-like legislation would write 
the limitations of the Copyright Clause out of the Constitution.245  This 
reducio ad absurdum argument relies upon the canon of statutory 
 
subject matter approach, see infra Part VI.A. 
 243. Aaron K. Perzanowski, The Penumbral Public Domain: Constitutional Limits on Quasi-
Copyright Legislation, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1081 (2008).   
 244. See id. at 1140–43 (criticizing the Martignon decision as failing to “faithfully appl[y]” the 
subject matter test when it concluded that the criminal anti-bootlegging statute was not a “copyright 
law”). 
 245. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 13, at 744 (“If this [independence-of-powers] line of reasoning 
were applied as a blanket rule, the Commerce Clause would render useless many provisions of the 
Constitution.”). 
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construction that one part of a law should not be construed so as to 
render another part superfluous.246  Taken literally, this argument proves 
too much.  At its core, it is really an argument against modern, 
expansive interpretations of the Commerce Clause power, which have 
undeniably rendered some Article I powers superfluous.247  Whatever 
one’s views on the original intent of the Commerce power, national 
economic regulation by Congress is a reality. 
As a result, those who wish to maintain any effective constitutional 
force to the Copyright Clause’s limitations are best served by cabining 
their claims to a limited, well-defined area.  Defining a sphere of subject 
matter through a “copyright law” test is a natural, intuitive way to 
achieve this.  A subject matter test will focus principally on the means—
and not the ends—of the congressional action, and thus will not unduly 
restrict Congress’s broad powers to regulate commerce.  For example, if 
Congress, in the exercise of its economic prerogatives, chooses to 
encourage database creation, it may do so in a variety of ways: tax 
benefits, criminal penalties, or even something like trade secret 
protection (which targets misappropriation—not simple copying—and 
has distinct prerequisites to protection248).  The only thing it may not do 
is generally prohibit copying by granting individuals property rights in 
the expression—i.e., create a “copyright law” for unoriginal works. 
The Copyright Clause indeed expresses the balance struck by the 
Framers between incentives to create and public access, but does so in a 
particular regulatory area.249  Expanding the well-defined limitations of 
the Copyright Clause to a wide subject matter area may, 
counterintuitively, risk undermining them.  For example, imagine that 
The Trade-Mark Cases had upheld the Trade-Mark Act of 1876 under 
Copyright Clause power, but only insofar as it protected marks that were 
“original.”  A predictable consequence of this system would be a 
loosening of notions of originality, as courts stretch the originality 
doctrine to cover moderately creative marks like, say, “Tide Detergent,” 
seeking to vindicate the expectations and investment of the first 
registrant, facilitate commerce, and avoid consumer confusion.  These 
 
 246. See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“It is a cardinal principle of statutory 
construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no 
clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.”) (citing Duncan v. Walker, 533 
U.S. 167, 121 (2001)). 
 247. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5 (granting Congress power “[t]o coin Money”).  Since 
money is an “instrumentality of interstate commerce,” regulation of money would seem well within the 
modern scope of the Commerce Clause.  See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995). 
 248. Trade secret protection typically requires that the information protected be “nonpublic” (that 
is, a secret) and that “reasonable measures to keep such information secret” be employed.  See, e.g., 18 
U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2012) (defining “trade secret” as used in the Economic Espionage Act of 1996). 
 249. See KISS II, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“[T]he Copyright Clause allows 
Congress to protect a narrowly defined subject matter within defined parameters.”). 
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diluted notions of originality would then risk importation into the 
traditional realm of copyright laws. 
Similarly, arguing that all Copyright Clause limitations must apply 
when Congress seeks to protect databases or live musical performance 
(regardless of the form of protection) may risk watering down these 
limitations, as courts bend doctrine so as to avoid the grave act of 
invalidating majoritarian legislation.  For example, if protection for live 
musical performances could only be had via the Copyright Clause, a 
court may well interpret “Writings” not to require fixation in order to 
avoid striking down an act of Congress; this holding, though designed to 
solve a particular pragmatic problem, would have ramifications 
throughout the whole of copyright law.  Thus, keeping the Copyright 
Clause tethered to a narrow area of “copyright laws” actually promotes 
Copyright Clause values by maintaining robust notions of originality, 
fixation, and so on, within their traditional sphere. 
2. Consistency with Precedent 
Another advantage of the subject matter approach is its convincing 
reconciliation of the leading Supreme Court cases, Gibbons and The 
Trade-Mark Cases.250  Recall that The Trade-Mark Cases, considering 
whether trademark legislation was within Congress’s powers, looked 
without any comment to the Commerce Clause as an alternate source of 
authority, while Gibbons held a similar move was not possible in the 
context of the RITA bankruptcy law.  The Second Circuit in Martignon 
explained the line between these two decisions as follows: 
The Gibbons Court considered primarily what RITA did, not Congress’s 
belief as to which clause authorized its action.  RITA mandated that an 
existing bankruptcy proceeding be handled differently from any other 
bankruptcy in the United States.  It also altered the statutory priorities for 
paying debts and the administrative scheme contemplated by the 
Bankruptcy Code. . . .  The Gibbons Court found that RITA was actually 
a bankruptcy law, not that it was . . . bankruptcy-like.251 
This distinction goes a long way to understanding the inter-Clause 
collision precedent.  The Trade-Mark Cases dealt with legislation that 
was, at most, copyright-like.  Though trademarks grant exclusionary 
rights to individuals, the activity proscribed—confusing use of another’s 
mark in commerce—is distinct from the key copyright right, a general 
prohibition on unauthorized reproduction.252  In contrast, it is hard to see 
 
 250. See supra Part II.B.1 (reviewing the facts and holdings of these cases). 
 251. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir. 2007) (emphasis added). 
 252. See infra Part VI.A (explaining in greater detail why trademarks are not “copyright laws”). 
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how RITA is not a bankruptcy statute: it changed the priority of 
repayment (the key feature of bankruptcy law) in a bankruptcy 
proceeding. 
Note that this analysis does not foreclose Congress from achieving 
the result it intended in RITA—securing economic benefits for 
employees laid off by a bankrupt railroad—through other types of 
legislation.  Congress would be free to pass an unemployment benefits 
package, create a special civil tort action, or offer tax refunds to the 
employees.  Congress might even pass a special tax transferring wealth 
from the creditors at issue to the employees—though such an act might 
not survive Takings Clause scrutiny,253 it is hard to see why it would 
present problems under the Bankruptcy Clause.  On this reading, the 
core statement of Gibbons is “Congress may not pass a nonuniform 
bankruptcy law.”  Similarly, Congress may not pass, for example, a 
temporally-unlimited copyright law.  However, it may (as The Trade-
Mark Cases implicitly held) pass temporally-unlimited legislation that 
does not have the core features of a copyright law. 
3. Workability and Definiteness 
In contrast to several of the competing theories,254 the “copyright 
law” test is a simple, reasonably definite approach.  Instead of relying 
on, for example, highly contested notions of congressional purpose, or 
whether values or inconsistencies are “fundamental,” the “copyright 
law” test relies on concepts—the activities proscribed, the material 
protected, and the character of the rights granted255—which are clear 
from the face of the statute at issue.  Further, the central focus of the 
inquiry draws on traditional intellectual property notions—like 
exclusive, individual property rights—with which judges are already 
familiar and, often, have well-established meanings in existing copyright 
doctrine.  Though there will inevitably be gray areas at the margin, the 
subject matter approach promises a clear, workable inquiry. 
4. Empty Formalism? 
One primary objection to the subject matter approach is that it is a 
highly formalist theory: what Congress may or may not do depends on 
how it chooses to act, not on the ultimate results or purposes of its 
 
 253. The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause prohibits private property from being taken “for 
public use” without just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend V. 
 254. See supra Part IV.A–D (reviewing four theories of the Copyright/Commerce Clause 
collision). 
 255. See infra Part IV.B (defining each of these inquiries). 
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action.  For example, as we shall see below,256 the subject matter 
approach advanced here means that Congress may prevent bootlegging 
of live musical performances through criminal penalties, but not civil 
liability.  The theory is admittedly a formalistic one, but this is largely 
by design:257 it is a formalistic solution to a formalistic problem.  This 
approach finds support in South Dakota v. Dole,258 a Supreme Court 
case on a different conflict of powers that is often overlooked in 
examining the Copyright/Commerce Clause collision.  The 
constitutional provisions at issue in Dole were the 21st Amendment—
which has been interpreted to reserve to the states broad powers over the 
regulation of alcohol259—and Congress’s spending power.260  Pursuant 
to its spending power, Congress enacted a law which denied states 
federal highway funds if they did not set the minimum drinking age at 
21 years or higher.261  South Dakota—whose laws allowed 19- and 20-
year-olds to buy low-alcohol beer—relied on the 21st Amendment to 
challenge the federal law as beyond Congress’s power.262  The Court 
held that the conditioning of federal funds was valid “even if Congress 
may not regulate drinking ages directly.”263   
The lesson of Dole is that Congress may often accomplish an 
objective indirectly, even when the Constitution appears to forbid the 
most direct means to achieve that goal.  This formalism does not make 
the language of the 21st Amendment—or of the Copyright Clause—into 
dead letter law.  The reason, of course, is that different means of 
congressional action carry different political costs, and so a restraint on 
means may well change the legislative outcome.  Take the anti-
bootlegging statutes as an example.  Though Congress easily passed 
both criminal and civil penalties against bootlegging, it is easy to 
imagine a world in which the political capital exists to create civil 
remedies for bootlegging, but Congress is unwilling to bring down the 
heavy arm of the criminal law on tens of thousands of (voting) Phish 
 
 256. See infra Part VI.D (analyzing the anti-bootlegging statutes under a “copyright law” test).  
 257. See supra Part V.A.1 (explaining how the formalistic nature of the “copyright law” inquiry 
prevents undue encroachment on Congress’s broad power over commerce so as not to undermine 
Copyright Clause limitations). 
 258. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 259. See id. at 205; California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 
97, 110 (1980) (“The Twenty-first Amendment grants the States virtually complete control over whether 
to permit importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor distribution system.”). 
 260. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, 
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare 
of the United States . . . .”). 
 261. See 23 U.S.C § 158 (2012). 
 262. Dole, 483 U.S. at 205. 
 263. Id. at 206. 
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fans.264  Further, two given means will rarely be identical ways of 
achieving a result.  Again using civil versus criminal enforcement as a 
comparison, the government must exercise prosecutorial discretion and 
expend government resources in enforcing criminal law; such choices 
are entirely left to private actors in the civil context. 
B. “Copyright Laws”: Core Factors 
The Second Circuit in Martignon defined “copyright laws” as 
legislative acts which “create, bestow, or allocate property rights in 
expression.”265  While this is a fine starting point, Martignon did not 
offer an expansive definition of these terms.  This section fills that gap 
by elaborating the key elements of the “copyright law” inquiry: the 
activity proscribed, the material protected, and the nature of the rights 
granted.  The general “copyright law” approach will be a kind of 
balancing test which weighs the degree of similarity or dissimilarity 
across these factors.  While strict identity of each element is not required 
to make an act of Congress a “copyright law,” a significant difference in 
even a single factor may be enough to make a law merely copyright-
like. 
1. Caveats 
a. Avoiding Circularity 
At the outset, it is important to observe a critical caveat to the analysis 
that follows: The express limitations in the Copyright Clause—i.e., 
limited times, originality, and fixation—may not themselves be relied 
upon to define what constitutes a “copyright law.”  To do so would deny 
any applicability to the limitations of the Copyright Clause, as the 
alleged constitutional deficiency of a piece of legislation could be relied 
upon to save it.  For example, opponents of anti-bootlegging statutes 
argue that the laws are unconstitutional because they protect unfixed 
artistic works in violation of the Copyright Clause’s command that 
rights may be secured in “Writings” only.266  Under the approach for 
which this Article advocates, the resolution of this argument will hinge 
 
 264. Phish is an American rock band known for a devoted fan base that makes recordings of their 
live performances.  See Wikipedia.com, Phish – Live performances, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phish 
(last visited February 5, 2013) (“Phish fans have been noted for their extensive collections of fan-taped 
concert recordings . . . .”). 
 265. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 150 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 266. See supra Part II.A.4 (presenting argument that the anti-bootlegging statutes are 
unconstitutional). 
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on whether the anti-bootlegging statutes are “copyright laws.”  To 
maintain that the anti-bootlegging statutes are not copyright laws 
because copyright laws protect only fixed works (or only original works, 
or protect only in a time-limited manner) simply begs the question.  
Courts have generally recognized the “circuitous” nature of such 
analysis and rejected these arguments.267 
b. “Copyright Law” as a Term of Art 
Secondly, it is critical to note that the term “copyright law” is 
employed here as a term of art for purposes of analyzing the 
Copyright/Commerce Clause collision.  In this context, “copyright law” 
is used to delineate what this Article has  referred to previously as a 
“sphere of applicability”268 for the Copyright Clause’s limitations: that 
is, those laws which are so similar to core copyright protection that they 
must comply with the Copyright Clause’s limitations.  In order to avoid 
unduly trammeling Congress’s power to regulate national commerce—
and thus preserve the robust limitations of the Copyright Clause within 
their traditional sphere269—the definition of “copyright law” that follows 
is a carefully circumscribed conception, incorporating only the most 
central elements of copyright law.  For example, the definition focuses 
principally on the proscription against unauthorized reproduction when 
discussing the actions proscribed by copyright,270 though many other 
acts—such as unauthorized creation of derivative works, or 
unauthorized public performance—are proscribed by the modern 
copyright statute. 271   
To be clear, “copyright law,” as used below, is not meant to represent 
the limits of Congress’s powers under the Copyright Clause.  Obviously, 
in conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause,272 Congress 
possesses broad powers to enact laws in the area of intellectual property.  
 
 267. See Martignon SDNY, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 425 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“The government 
argues, circuitously, that because the anti-bootlegging statute regulates a subject matter, live 
performances, that is not copyrightable—by virtue of the lack of fixation and durational limitation—
Congress was not bound by the Copyright Clause’s restrictions.  I find this argument to be wholly 
unconvincing.”). 
 268. See supra Part III (arguing that, to be consistent with Supreme Court precedent, any theory 
of Copyright/Commerce Clause collision must delineate some limited sphere in which the Copyright 
Clause’s limitations will be externally applied). 
 269. See supra Part V.A.1 (arguing that limited subject matter approach operates to preserve 
traditional Copyright Clause values and limitations by not stretching them beyond the traditional realm). 
 270. See infra Part V.B.2. 
 271. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (listing exclusive rights of copyright holders). 
 272. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 
(1819) (defining “necessary and proper” broadly, to include all “appropriate” means to achieve an end 
that is legitimate, and within the scope of the Constitution). 
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Thus, for example, the Copyright Act of 1976’s criminal enforcement 
provisions273 are easily a proper exercise of Copyright Clause powers 
even though they do not “secure[e] . . . Right[s]”274 in any individual—
enforcement is left to the government.275  Criminal copyright provisions 
are thus within the Copyright Clause power, even though they are not a 
“copyright law” as the term is used below.  But however broad the scope 
of Congress’s necessary and proper powers under the Copyright Clause, 
they cannot be used to enact laws which defy the express restrictions of 
the Copyright Clause.276  It is those laws which fail to satisfy a 
Copyright Clause limitation—and must be justified, if at all, under a 
different enumerated power—that are subject to the “copyright law” 
inquiry that follows. 
2. What Actions are Proscribed 
A natural way to begin the “copyright law” inquiry is to look to the 
particular actions the law at issue proscribes.  Though the modern 
copyright statute provides a variety of actionable violations—
prohibiting, inter alia, the unauthorized public performance or public 
display of a copyrighted work277—the key proscription is the first listed: 
the reproduction of a copyrighted work without consent of the copyright 
holder.278  The first Copyright Act of 1790—the prototypical “copyright 
law” for constitutional purposes—unsurprisingly focused its 
prohibitions against unauthorized reproduction.279  Copyright laws, as 
their name suggests, are an exclusive right in copying.  Thus, before 
delving into the more nuanced inquiries of the “copyright law” test, it is 
an often helpful heuristic to ask the simple question: does the law at 
issue proscribe copying, or another activity?  The answer to this 
question should not necessarily be determinative—as property rights in 
 
 273. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2012) (providing for criminal penalties for “willful” infringement of 
a copyright for commercial gain). 
 274. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 275. See infra Part V.B.4 (arguing that criminal laws cannot be considered “copyright“ laws 
because they grant rights to punish to the government, not possessory rights to individuals).  
 276. It should be noted here that the criminal copyright provisions do not flout any of the 
Copyright Clause’s restrictions.  Unlike the criminal anti-bootlegging statutes, they are time-limited, see 
17 U.S.C. § 507(a) (2012) (establishing five-year statute of limitations for criminal copyright 
infringement), and protect only original, fixed works, see id. § 506(a)(1) (limiting scope of criminal 
provisions to willful infringement of a “copyright” under the usual provision of Title 17). 
 277. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)–(5) (2012). 
 278. See id. § 106(1) (2012) (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights 
to . . . reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords.”). 
 279. “Vending” the copyrighted work was also prohibited. See Act of May 30, 1790, ch. 15, 1 
Stat. 124 (repealed 1831) (providing copyright holders “shall have the sole right and liberty of printing, 
reprinting, publishing and vending” copyrighted works). 
47
Hickey: Copyright/Commerce Clause Collision: A Subject Matter Approach
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2014
48 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 82 
expression may be secured in other ways280—but looking to the activity 
proscribed provides a useful touchstone for the “copyright law” inquiry. 
3. The Material Protected 
The next step in the inquiry is to look at the material granted 
protection under the law.  Copyright laws provide rights in 
expression.281  The categories of works copyrightable under federal law 
have expanded greatly since the time of the Constitution,282 but all share 
common, expressive features as the “Writings” of “Authors.”283  The 
first federal copyright law limited itself to charts, maps, and books.284  
Later acts of Congress extended protection to musical compositions,285 
photographic works,286 and the fine arts.287  The modern copyright 
statute covers several broad categories such as literary, musical, 
dramatic, and pictorial works.288  These are all canonical forms of 
artistic expression.  “Expression,” for our purposes, may be defined 
broadly as the “fruits of intellectual or artistic labor.”289   
When considering the “material protected” factor, one must be careful 
to avoid the circularity issues discussed in more detail above.290  Though 
it may seem natural to read requirements of originality (or fixation) into 
this usage of the word “expression,” such affirmative limitations of the 
Copyright Clause should not be incorporated into the “copyright law” 
test.  To do so would allow the very reasons that the law is suspect in the 
first instance to save it from Copyright Clause scrutiny. 
4. The Nature of the Rights Granted 
The final—and perhaps most important—element of the “copyright 
 
 280. The Martignon court recognized this point when it noted that “the word ‘copyright’ does not 
appear in [the Copyright Clause]. . . . The clause thus empowers Congress to ‘secur[e] . . . Right[s].’” 
Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 150 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 281. See id. (“[Copyright laws] all seem to share a common feature: They allocate rights in 
expression.”). 
 282. See generally R. Anthony Reese, Innocent Infringement in U.S. Copyright Law: A History, 
30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 133, 135–40 (2007) (providing a brief overview of evolution of copyrightable 
subject matter from the Statute of Anne to 1909). 
 283. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 284. Act of May 30, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1831). 
 285. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436 (repealed 1870). 
 286. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, § 1, 13 Stat. 540, 540 (repealed 1870). 
 287. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (repealed 1909). 
 288. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 289. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (“[T]he word ‘writings’ . . . may be 
interpreted to include any physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor.”). 
 290. See supra Part V.B.1.a. 
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law” test looks to the character of the rights granted by the law.  This 
inquiry may be subdivided into three components: (1) whether the 
interest granted is a property right; (2) to whom the right is granted; and 
(3) the scope of the right granted. 
The rights secured through copyright laws are fundamentally property 
rights.291  As a consequence, the rights will typically be exclusionary 
and transferable,292 two features which are deeply embedded into current 
federal copyright law.293  Non-exclusive rights do not trigger the kind of 
government-backed monopoly (and monopoly costs) that so concerned 
the Framers of the Copyright Clause.294  Transferability, while perhaps 
less central to the inquiry, is a traditional indicia of a property right. 
Also critical will be to whom the rights are granted.  Property rights 
are usually located in an individual or corporation.  If a law instead 
grants a right to the government, it is unlikely to be a property (and thus 
a copyright) law.  For example, laws granting protection enforced only 
through criminal enforcement are difficult to characterize as “property 
rights.”  Such rights are not “owned” by anyone; they are given force 
only at the discretion of the government, not a private possessor of the 
right.  Criminal laws function as an expression of social or moral 
opprobrium,295 giving the government a right to punish a misdeed, rather 
than as an allocation of an exclusive possessory interest. 
Finally, as should be apparent from the analysis thus far, the purview 
of copyright is quite broad.  That is, copyright laws, typically, are 
generalized rights against unauthorized reproduction.  The existence of 
restrictions which limit the scope of the protection granted to a narrow 
area may thus serve to distinguish copyright laws from the mere 
copyright-like.  A comparison of copyright with trademark law is 
 
 291. I use the term “property” here in its more traditional, limited sense of transferable and 
exclusive rights to “possess, use or enjoy a determinate thing.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1335 (9th 
ed. 2009).  Broader notions of “new property”—like an expectation in the receipt of government 
benefits, protected under the 5th and 14th Amendments as a property “interest,” see, e.g., Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976)—will typically not be considered “property rights” for our purposes.  
See generally Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (recognizing government 
largess as an increasingly important form of property). 
 292. See, e.g., Emily Sherwin, Two- and Three-Dimensional Property Rights, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
1075, 1079 (1997) (defining property as “one person’s full and exclusive right to use, enjoy, and transfer 
a tangible thing”). 
 293. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (2012) (providing that “a copyright may be transferred in whole or 
in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law”); id. § 106 (granting copyright holder series 
of “exclusive rights”). 
 294. See Heald & Sherry, supra note 15, at 1160–62 (explaining that Framers of the Constitution 
deeply distrusted governmental grants of exclusive rights which imposed monopoly costs on the public). 
 295. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life Of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 
2075–76 (2005) (“[A] criminal law typically carries with it a fairly high level of moral opprobrium.  In 
contrast, one may often incur private law liability without triggering moral opprobrium.”) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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instructive on this point.  Holding a valid trademark does not prevent 
others from copying or using the mark generally.  Rather, exclusive 
rights adhere only when others use the mark, in commerce, in a way 
likely to create confusion among consumers.296  Trademarks are thus 
specialized, narrow grants of rights against particular uses in 
commerce.297  This is one reason why, historically, they were viewed as 
a tort of unfair competition, rather than as intellectual property.298 
VI. APPLYING THE THEORY 
This Part applies the “copyright law” test derived above to the four 
areas of the Copyright/Commerce Clause collision that were discussed 
in the first section of this Article: trademarks, database protection, the 
DMCA, and the anti-bootlegging statutes. 
A. Trademarks 
As the preceding discussion has already made clear,299 trademark 
protection cannot be considered a “copyright law.”  To be sure, 
trademark laws do possess some of the indicia of copyright laws.  
Trademarks are property rights granted to an individual, which are, 
within their (narrow) scope, exclusive and transferable.300  Much of the 
material protected by trademark can be considered expression, in that 
marks often incorporate pictorial and/or literary elements.  Further, 
trademark laws might be said to proscribe some reproductions of a 
registered mark, in the sense that copying a mark, under certain 
conditions, triggers liability.  However, what is truly proscribed by 
 
 296. See Patry, supra note 16, at 391 (“[T]rademark laws . . . are directed at redressing consumer 
confusion over the origin of products. . . .  The focus of trademark protection is not on design qua design 
(i.e., as a “writing”), but rather on design as a source identifier.”). 
 297. A similar analysis may be made with regard to federal trade secret law.  Federal trade secret 
protection prohibits unauthorized copying of a trade secret only if the misappropriator has “intent to 
convert a trade secret” for economic gain to a non-owner. 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (2012).  To be considered 
a “trade secret” under the EEA, the information must be nonpublic and economically valuable, and the 
owner must employ reasonable measures be taken to maintain its secrecy.  Id. § 1839(3).  In sum, like 
trademark, the protection granted is thus considerably narrower in scope than copyright. 
 298. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text (explaining the historical and modern 
categorization of trademark law). 
 299. See supra notes 295–297 and accompanying text. 
 300. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (2012) (establishing that registration constitutes evidence of an 
“exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce” in connection with goods or services specified 
in registration); id. § 1060 (providing for the assignment of a trademark to another).  With regard to 
transferability, the trademark law requires that the assignee of the trademark use it only on products 
similar in kind and quality to those of the assignor.  See, e.g., Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927, 929–30 
(2d Cir. 1984) (explaining that using assigned trademark on dissimilar products constitutes invalid 
transfer of trademark without associated goodwill). 
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trademark law is the use of a registered mark in commerce, in a way 
likely to confuse consumers.301  Simple copying alone cannot trigger 
liability.  Trademarks are thus not a generalized right against 
unauthorized reproduction; they are instead a species of commercial 
regulation effectuated through limited exclusive rights.  As such, they 
are not “copyright laws,” and need not comport with the Copyright 
Clause’s limitations. 
B. Database Protection 
Whether a sui generis system of protection for factual compilations 
and databases is a “copyright law” will depend on the form of database 
protection enacted.  Congress has not chosen to enact such protection, 
though several proposals were put forward in the wake of Feist.302  
Regardless of the form of protection enacted (if any), the material 
protected will almost certainly be “expression” for our purposes, as the 
information in databases can usually be considered fruits of intellectual 
labor.303  (Though many databases will not satisfy the standard of 
originality as articulated in Feist,304 affirmative limitations of the 
Copyright Clause cannot be relied upon to distinguish a copyright law, 
lest the whole inquiry become circular.305)  Aside from this factor, 
however, it is difficult to generalize about database protection in the 
abstract.  Two given forms of database protection may be radically 
different in terms of either the actions proscribed or the nature of the 
rights granted—and thus one may be a “copyright law” while another is 
not.  
A comparison between two congressional proposals for database 
protection,306 analyzed in greater detail by Professor Yochai Benkler,307 
is instructive on this point.  The broader bill, the “Collections of 
Information Antipiracy Act,” (the CIAA) has the characteristics of a 
“copyright law” and so is unconstitutional as it protects non-original 
works in contravention of Feist.  The CIAA broadly prohibits 
 
 301. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2012) (providing cause of action when a registered mark, without 
consent of the registrant, is used in commerce in a way “likely to cause confusion” among consumers). 
 302. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text (citing to congressional proposals for database 
protection and academic commentary regarding these proposals). 
 303. See supra Part V.B.3 (defining “expression” for purposes of the “copyright law” inquiry). 
 304. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991) (requiring 
independent creation and a minimal degree of creativity as a prerequisite to copyright). 
 305. See supra Part V.B.1.a (explaining the circularity issue). 
 306. H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. (1999).  Both bills were referred to 
and reported out of committee.  See H.R. REP. NO. 106-350, pt. 1 (1999) (describing H.R. 354, the 
“Collections of Information Antipiracy Act”); H.R. REP. NO. 106-349, pt. 1 (1999) (describing H.R. 
1858, the “Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act of 1999”). 
 307. See Benkler, supra note 65, at 578–86 (comparing House Bill 354 and House Bill 1858).   
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“extraction” of the information in a database either to (1) make the 
information available to others, or (2) in a manner that causes market 
harm to the producer of the original database.308  This means the CIAA 
may reach activities as basic as loaning a CD-ROM database to a friend 
so she may make a personal copy.309  Functionally—if “market harm” is 
given a reasonably broad construction—the CIAA’s prohibitions on 
extraction operate as a general prohibition on reproduction.310  As to the 
nature of the rights granted, the CIAA establishes a private right of 
action in the creator of the source database311—that is, an exclusive, 
transferable312 property right.  It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that 
the CIAA is a “copyright law” that must comport with the Copyright 
Clause’s requirements. 
In contrast, the “Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act of 
1999” (the CIAIA) is not a copyright law, and instead a permissible 
commercial regulation under the Commerce Clause.  First, the CIAIA’s 
prohibitions are much more limited than those of the CIAA.  The CIAIA 
does not proscribe the act of duplicating a database, but only selling or 
distributing copied databases in commerce, and in competition with the 
original database.313  Unlike the CIAA, the CIAIA does not reach 
personal reproductions, targeting only business competitors “free-
riding” on the work of the original database creator.314  It is, like 
trademark law, a narrow grant of rights, prohibiting only particular uses 
of copied expression in commerce.  Secondly, the CIAIA does not 
create a private right of action and would instead grant enforcement 
power to the Federal Trade Commission.315  As the CIAIA does not 
create private property rights, nor broadly proscribe unauthorized 
reproduction, it is not a copyright law.  It serves as a good example of 
how database protection might be accomplished under Commerce 
Clause authority without violating the limits of the Copyright Clause. 
C. The DMCA’s Anti-Circumvention Provisions 
The DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions ultimately survive 
Copyright Clause scrutiny.  First, the provisions enforcing access 
 
 308. H.R. 354 § 1402. 
 309. See Benkler, supra note 65, at 579 (using this as an example of the CIAA’s scope). 
 310. See id. at 583 (“In effect, House Bill 354 functions economically like an intellectual property 
rule.”). 
 311. H.R. 354 § 1406. 
 312. See H.R. 354 § 1402 (giving protection to “successors in interest” of the original database 
creator). 
 313. H.R. 1858 § 102. 
 314. See Benkler, supra note 65, at 579. 
 315. H.R. 1858 § 107. 
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restrictions316 are not copyright laws.  The action proscribed is not 
reproduction, but only the circumvention of a technological protection 
measure to gain access to a work protected by said measures.  Though 
this aspect of the DMCA tends to strengthen copyright rights by 
deterring piracy, a law banning contravention of access restrictions is no 
more a copyright law than a law prohibiting the breaking of a safe in 
which copyrighted works are stored.317 
The provisions enforcing use restrictions,318 however, are of a 
different character.  These might be construed as copyright laws, since 
they may effectively prohibit an owner or user of a copyrighted work 
from reproducing the work (or creating a derivative work, or any of the 
other “rights of the copyright owner” protected by the technological 
measure).319  The material protected is identical, as the DMCA applies 
only to works protected under the copyright statutes.320  Finally, the 
rights granted are substantially similar, as the DMCA provides for 
individual civil (as well as criminal) actions to enforce its anti-
circumvention provisions.  In sum, the use restrictions create exclusive 
rights to prohibit conduct (via technological measures) that is often 
already proscribed by traditional copyright laws.  There is one feature, 
however, that may serve to distinguish the use restriction provisions 
from typical copyright laws: It is only trafficking in devices—not the act 
of circumvention itself—that is prohibited.321  Since the personal actions 
of the user are not controlled by this provision, the right granted is more 
specialized than the general copyright grant—it may be that, like 
trademark law, the narrower scope of the right sufficiently distinguishes 
the use restriction provisions from typical “copyright laws.”322 
Ultimately, however, it is unclear whether the DMCA’s use 
restrictions even violate any of the Copyright Clause’s limitations.  Most 
of the concerns about creating de facto perpetual rights focus on the 
access restrictions—which, as we have seen, are unequivocally not 
“copyright laws”—and not the use restrictions.323  Further, as the Elcom 
 
 316. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2012). 
 317. See David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. 
L. REV. 673, 686 (2000) (“The basic provision [of the DMCA] is equivalent to breaking into a castle—
the invasion inside another’s property is itself the offense. . . .  [T]he gravamen here is not copyright 
infringement.”). 
 318. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (2012). 
 319. See id. § 1201(b)(1)(A)–(C) (extending protection only when the “technological measure that 
effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title”). 
 320. Id. 
 321. See id. § 1201(b)(1) (“No person shall manufacture . . . or otherwise traffic in any 
technology, product, service, device . . . .”). 
 322. See supra Part VI.A (arguing that trademarks are not copyright laws due to narrow character 
of the rights granted). 
 323. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text (explaining theories under which the DMCA 
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court recognized, the series of assumptions required to reach the 
conclusion that the anti-circumvention provisions create perpetual rights 
rests on “tenuous” empirical grounds.324  Such hypothetical scenarios 
are a weak basis upon which to strike down a statute as facially 
unconstitutional.  The Copyright Clause does not protect against all 
potential adverse consequences to copyright values; rather, it prohibits 
the enactment of copyright laws in violation of its express limitations. 
D. The Anti-Bootlegging Statutes 
As alluded to previously,325 the criminal anti-bootlegging statute326 is 
not a “copyright law” because it cannot be considered a property right.  
The “rights” granted by Section 2319A are not held by any individual.  
Though a performer may complain about bootlegging, enforcement is 
had only at the discretion of the government; the performer does not 
“own” anything.  As a criminal law, the presumed motivation is one of 
moral disapproval: the law serves as a societal expression that particular 
conduct is wrong and should be punished.  Though it may incidentally 
trigger the sort of monopoly costs that motivated the Framers of the 
Copyright Clause,327 allocation of wealth is not the primary motivation, 
and the discretionary enforcement mechanism may reduce the incidence 
of such costs. 
The civil anti-bootlegging statute,328 in contrast, possesses all the 
characteristics of a copyright law.  Its proscriptions are targeted against 
unauthorized reproduction of live musical performances.329  Though 
transmission and distribution of bootlegged copies is also prohibited,330 
the production of a first unauthorized copy will typically be a necessary 
prerequisite to liability.  As to the material protected, it can scarcely be 
doubted that musical performances constitute expression.331  Finally, the 
rights granted are identical to those of usual copyright laws: Section 
 
may allow for the creation of de facto perpetual rights and tie up the public domain). 
 324. See United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1141 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (“[T]he 
argument that Congress’ ban on the sale of circumvention tools has the effect of allowing publishers to 
claim copyright-like protection in public domain works is tenuous and unpersuasive.”). 
 325. See supra Part V.B.4 (explaining that criminally-enforced laws cannot be considered 
possessory in nature). 
 326. See 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2012). 
 327. See Heald & Sherry, supra note 15, at 1160–62 (explaining that the Framers of the 
Constitution deeply distrusted governmental grants of exclusive rights which imposed monopoly costs 
on the public). 
 328. 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012). 
 329. Id. § 1101(a)(1). 
 330. Id. § 1101(a)(2)–(3). 
 331. “Musical works” are listed second, after only literary works, among the categories of 
protected works in the current copyright statute.  17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2). 
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1101 makes violators liable “to the same extent as an infringer of 
copyright.”332  Section 1101 thus allocates exclusive, property rights in 
an individual (the performer), consisting primarily of a generalized right 
against unauthorized reproduction.333  Section 1101 is therefore a 
“copyright law,” and invalid if it does not comport with the limitations 
of the Copyright Clause. 
The preceding analysis does not necessarily mean that the whole of 
Section 1101 must be ruled unconstitutional or that the federal 
government is powerless to regulate bootlegging.  Under the theory this 
Article has advanced, all the Copyright Clause requires is that 
“copyright laws” satisfy its explicit restrictions.  As an initial matter, 
this means that Section 1101 must contain some sort of statute of 
limitations—whether added through amendment or judicially 
implied334—to comport with the “limited Times” requirement.  The 
fixation problem is more intractable, though it has not yet been 
definitively established that fixation is a constitutional requirement.335  
Even if it is so held, the third act prohibited under Section 1101—which 
bans only trafficking in bootlegged records336—might be saved by 
severing it from the rest of Section 1101.  A law banning only sale and 
distribution of an article in commerce is a much narrower right than the 
typical, generalized, copyright grant—like trademark, such a prohibition 
may be construed as a specialized commercial regulation, and thus not a 
copyright law.337  Finally, the federal government is free to enforce a 
policy against bootlegging through other means (like Section 2319A), 
and there is no barrier to regulation of unfixed performances by the 
states. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
As this Article has endeavored to show, whether Congress may avoid 
the limitations of the Copyright Clause through reliance on Commerce 
 
 332. Id. § 1101(a). 
 333. There is one potentially relevant distinction between rights under Section 1101 and familiar 
copyright rights.  Section 1101 grants rights contingent on the consent of the “performer or performers 
involved”—not the owner of copyright in the performance—so it is not immediately apparent whether 
these rights are transferable to persons other than the performer.  This difference, however, is not 
enough to make Section 1101 not a copyright law.   
 334. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (exploring possibilities to imply statute of 
limitations for anti-bootlegging statutes). 
 335. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (explaining the debate over whether fixation is a 
constitutional requirement). 
 336. 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2012) (making liable anyone who “distributes or offers to distribute, 
sells or offers to sell, rents or offers to rent, or traffics in any [bootlegged] copy or phonorecord”). 
 337. See supra Part VI.A (arguing that trademarks are not copyright laws due to narrow character 
of the rights granted). 
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Clause power is a question in need of a consistent, coherent theory, 
applicable to areas as diverse as trademark protection and the DMCA.  
This Article has offered such a unified theory in its subject matter 
approach.  The basic idea is simple: Acts of Congress that are so similar 
to traditional forms of intellectual property protection so as to be 
“copyright laws” must comport with the requirements of the Copyright 
Clause—notwithstanding the availability of an alternative enumerated 
power.  To give substantive content to the “copyright law” inquiry, this 
Article has articulated and defined several important factors—the 
activities proscribed, the material protected, and the nature of the rights 
granted.  The “copyright law” test provides a clear, workable resolution 
to the Copyright/Commerce Clause collision that reconciles seemingly 
inconsistent precedents.  Recognizing Congress’s broad power to 
legislate in areas significant to national commerce, the “copyright law” 
test is flexible, allowing Congress to regulate most areas if it so chooses, 
so long as the means of regulation are carefully crafted.  Perhaps most 
important, the “copyright law” theory functions to maintain, within their 
traditional sphere of applicability, an effective role for the limitations of 
the Copyright Clause. 
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